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NIETZSCHEAN CRITIQUE AND
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS
Francis J. Mootz III*
Legal practice naturally invites hermeneutical analysis.
Lawyers and judges spend much of their time interpreting
authoritative legal texts within the context of evolving social
settings that also must be interpreted. In his masterwork, Truth
and Method,' Hans-Georg Gadamer argues that legal practice has
exemplary significance for hermeneutical philosophy, but he
moves well beyond the now commonplace recognition that legal
actors must interpret texts and social contexts. His "philosophical
hermeneutics" challenges the traditional account of a self-
possessed subject bringing her exegetical prowess to bear on
distinct objects that suffer her interpretation. Gadamer
rehabilitates practical philosophy by arguing that understanding
involves a prudential application of the tradition to the demands of
the present, but he radicalizes this account. Gadamer emphasizes
that an interpreter is drawn into an event of interpretation in
* Professor of Law, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law. Parts of an
earlier draft of this paper were presented at the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Working
Group on Law, Culture and the Humanities, convened at the University of Texas in
March, 2001; at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, convened at the
Central European University in Budapest, Hungary in July, 2001; and at the conference
symposium on Nietzsche and Legal Theory, convened at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School
of Law in October, 2001. I am indebted for the many helpful comments and suggestions
received from audiences along the way, and in particular I acknowledge the assistance
provided by Peter Fitzpatrick, George Taylor, and Victor Romero. I also was fortunate to
have the generous support of Dean Peter Glenn and the Law School, both with respect to
my research activities and my travel, which permitted me to develop this article.
See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald
G. Marshall trans., Crossroad, 2d rev. ed. 1989) (1960). Specifically, Gadamer believes
that legal practice has exemplary significance for the second of his three principal topics:
the historicity of all understanding. Gadamer argues that to understand at all is to
understand differently, because understanding always involves an application of
preunderstandings to present circumstances and questions. This reality is particularly
revealed in the dynamic of adjudication, in which the governing rule is always in flux as it
is applied to new situations.
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which her own horizon of understanding also is put at risk and
reconfigured. Interpretation, Gadamer famously argues, is a
fusion of horizons, in which the interpreter and the tradition enter
a relationship that has the structure of a dialogue-a playful give-
and-take-with the result that the interpreter and the tradition are
mutually transformed to some degree. Philosophical hermeneutics
challenges methodological approaches to interpretation by
claiming that genuine understanding is possible only when the
interpreter risks her prejudiced horizon of preunderstanding in
dialogic experience.
The epistemological and ontological implications of
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics are profound. When
brought to bear against the naturalism of religious fundamentalists
who posit absolute moral principles that transcend individual
interests and desires, philosophical hermeneutics is generally
applauded and appears almost trite. However, Jurgen Habermas
has led the way in vehemently rejecting Gadamer's excessive zeal
in pursuing the hermeneutical turn. In effect, Habermas accuses
Gadamer of going "postmodern" while clearing a path through thejungle of modern subjectivism, arguing that Gadamer wholly
abandons the Enlightenment commitment to critical rationality in
his effort to move beyond subject-centered metaphysics.
Habermas agrees that the experience of practical wisdom in the
course of conversational give-and-take is an important and
unavoidable part of the concrete decision-making of individuals
living within a social context, but he insists that the very grounds
for morality and legality can and must be clarified and defended
philosophically. Put differently, Habermas acknowledges that the
defense of reason must be "post-metaphysical," but foresees dire
consequences if theorists abandon altogether the Enlightenment
commitment to rational reconstruction.
In his recent book, Between Facts and Norms,2 Habermas
extends his criticism of Gadamer's postmodern hermeneutics to
pressing issues in contemporary legal philosophy. Habermas
acknowledges that law cannot achieve the principled determinacy
of moral truths, but insists that law does rise above the pure
historical contingency of shared ethical traditions.' Habermas
2 JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996)
(1992).
3 Habermas argues that the Discourse Principle subtends both law and morality, and
therefore that neither can be reduced to the traditionalism of socially-constructed ethical
life. Id. at 105. However, Habermas recognizes important distinctions between law and
morality. Moral norms are valid if, and only if, they satisfy the Discourse Principle,
whereas legal norms also are subject to pragmatic considerations. Id. at 108. Moral norms
[Vol. 24:3
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begins with the insight that law is Janus-faced, in that it operates
between social systems that can be studied scientifically and norms
that must be justified philosophically.4 Law claims legitimacy by
appealing to universality and reason, but in fact it always operates
in particular social settings and within institutional constraints that
lend a high degree of certainty to its operations.' Habermas
regards Gadamer's conclusion that law is grounded in an artful
development of a living tradition to be dangerous. This is because
we no longer have recourse to a thick tradition of substantive
reason that is carefully developed through the rhetorical
elaboration of shared topoi. Arguing that tradition cannot bear
the substantive weight that Gadamer places on it, Habermas
underwrites the universal aspirations of law with "communicative
reason," which operates as a "weak transcendental necessity" that
generally orients us to validity claims even if it cannot specify
applicable substantive norms in a particular legal dispute.6 By
reconstructing the operation of communicative reason in legal
discourse, Habermas explains, philosophers can articulate a
"critical standard, against which actual practices-the opaque and
perplexing reality of the constitutional state-[can] be evaluated."7
In our post-traditional and post-metaphysical age, we can avoid
postmodern chaos only if philosophers uncover the communicative
rationality that subtends hermeneutical practices. In short,
Habermas believes that critical theory is the only antidote to the
multicultural dissolution of lifeworld cohesion.
In a series of articles, I have defended Gadamer's
hermeneutical insights and rejected Habermas's commitment
(however chastened) to the philosophical goals of the
Enlightenment, and I will not rehearse my argument in detail.'
bind the individual internally and absolutely, whereas legal norms are pragmatically
restricted to governing external relations between citizens in restricted ways. Id. at 112.
Finally, the pragmatically limited scope of legal norms has the important effect of reducing
the cognitive uncertainty that an individual encounters in trying to discern relevant moral
norms. In other words, legal norms are more readily accessible and certain in their
application. Id. at 114-17.
4 Id. at 21. Habermas uses a series of revealing metaphors, describing law as a
"hinge," "transmission belt" and "transformer" between modern social systems and the
lifeworld. Id. at 76-81.
5 Habermas describes the challenge of adjudication as mediating the tension between
laws as social facts and laws as norms that promote justice. Id. at 194-237.
6 Id. at 4-5.
7 Id. at 5.
8 For my analysis of the Gadamer-Habermas debate, see Francis J. Mootz III, The
Ontological Basis of Legal Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the Work
of Gadamer, Habermas, and Ricoeur, 68 B.U. L. REV. 523, 568-96 (1988); Francis J. Mootz
III, Psychotherapeutic Practice as a Model for Postmodern Legal Theory, 12 YALE J.L &
HUMAN. 299, 306-40 (2000). For my general account of the significance of Gadamer's
2003]
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Generally speaking, I am persuaded by Gadamer's rejection of
Habermas's attempts to go behind fluid hermeneutical practices in
order to identify an abiding, stable and justificatory ground for
those practices. If we recognize that hermeneutical practices
cannot claim to be grounded in a univocal natural order in the
post-metaphysical age, it seems equally clear that we cannot save
the day by replacing metaphysical guarantees with Habermas's
quasi-transcendental conception of "communicative reason." For
present purposes it is sufficient to begin with my commitment to
Gadamer's radically postmodern attack on Habermas's residual
rationalism. The problem at hand is to investigate where Gadamer
leads us.
Even if I am correct that Gadamer "wins" his debate with
Habermas by demonstrating that Habermas's critical theory
remains trapped within the metaphysics of universal principles and
grand narratives, it does not follow that Gadamer has successfully
answered Habermas's critique. Gadamer is obligated to provide a
detailed response to Habermas's charge that Gadamer's
philosophy leads to political conservatism and the abandonment of
traditions of philosophical practice that have helped to instantiate
reason in social institutions. Gadamer cannot meet this obligation
solely by issuing his own challenge to Habermas's post-
metaphysical critique. Gadamer would concede that it is highly
implausible to reject out of hand any manner of critical theory, and
he never makes such a broad claim in his debate with Habermas.
Although Gadamer is unclear about the status of critical theory in
his philosophical hermeneutics, my thesis is that Gadamer's
philosophical hermeneutics legitimates critical theory sufficiently
to respond to the accusation that he promotes traditionalism and
quietism. Under my reading, Gadamer's philosophical
hermeneutics holds the most promise for developing a postmodern
critical hermeneutics.
My strategy for drawing a hermeneutical approach to critical
theory out of Gadamer's work is to challenge Gadamer by
questioning whether philosophical hermeneutics can accommodate
Nietzschean critique. If anything can be said of Nietzsche with
certainty, it is that Nietzsche was a relentless critic of nearly
everything that he saw around him in society. Nietzschean critique
is relentless, caustic and seemingly all-encompassing. Nietzschean
critique is particularly interesting, though, because it is embedded
philosophical hermeneutics, see Francis J. Mootz Ill, Law in Flux: Philosophical
Hermeneutics, Legal Argumentation, and the Natural Law Tradition, II YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 311 (1999) [hereinafter Mootz, Law in Flux]; Francis J. Mootz III, Rhetorical
Knowledge in Legal Practice and Theory, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 491 (1998).
[Vol. 24:3
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in a fundamental attack on the Western metaphysical tradition.
Postmodern thinkers generally trace their intellectual debts back
to Nietzsche, but Nietzsche stands diametrically opposed to the
caricature of a postmodern thinker who is paralyzed by the
collapse of metaphysics and therefore incapable of critical
theorizing. Consequently, Gadamer's arguments against
Habermas's critical theory do not carry much force in response to
Nietzschean critique. My thesis is that by understanding how
Nietzsche can at once be a critical theorist and a postmodern critic
of the metaphysical tradition, we can develop an important
resource for articulating the role of critical theory within
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics.9  By exploring the
connections between Nietzschean critique and philosophical
hermeneutics, I will suggest an affirmative Gadamerian response
to the challenges issued by Habermas and other critical theorists.
My argument is organized in five parts. In'Part One, I assess
Allan Hutchinson's Nietzschean-inspired claim that radical
critique in the tradition of the critical legal studies movement
provides a necessary antidote to the hermeneutical
conventionalism that Gadamer exhibits in his account of law.
Having described the challenge posed from within legal theory, in
Part Two I develop an account of Nietzschean critique by drawing
on recent philosophical reconstructions of his critical activity. I
argue that Nietzsche adopts a naturalistic account, but that he
characterizes human nature as perspectival and therefore regards
critique as a rhetorical activity rather than a demonstrative
activity. In Part Three, I build on my model of Nietzschean
critique by comparing it with Gadamer's philosophical
hermeneutics. I argue that it is productive to read these two
philosophers as challenging supplements to one another. In Part
Four, I develop my hermeneutical model of Nietzschean critique
through a close and critical reading of Gianni Vattimo's nihilistic
philosophy, which he derives in large part from Nietzsche. I
conclude that Hutchinson's attack on Gadamer's alleged
conservatism misses the mark because there is room for
Nietzschean critique within philosophical hermeneutics, and that
beginning with Gadamer's philosophy accommodates a more
satisfactory account of critique than Hutchinson provides.
I conclude the article by applying my argument to a pressing
issue in American life: the legal status of homosexuals. The
I recognize that Nietzsche is an important and interesting thinker for many reasons,
and I certainly do not wish to claim that my use of Nietzsche exhausts his relevance for
modern thought. My only goal is to establish that he is an important resource for my
specific project of defining a critical hermeneutics.
2003]
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Supreme Court has addressed this problem in three prominent
cases by hermeneutically assessing relevant legal texts and shifting
social contexts, but these opinions have been unpersuasive for
many observers. Without pretending to provide a single "correct"
answer to the issues facing the Court, in Part Five I demonstrate
that the Court's opinions fail on simple hermeneutical grounds,
and that some form of Nietzschean critique naturally follows in the
wake of these hermeneutical failures. I conclude that Nietzschean
critique does not contradict the presuppositions of philosophical
hermeneutics, but instead works from a shared postmodern
account of social reason in a complementary fashion. My aim is to
show that Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is profitably
extended by embracing Nietzschean critique.
I. THE DEMAND FOR RADICAL CRITIQUE AS A CHALLENGE TO
HERMENEUTICAL ACCOUNTS OF LAW
The world of Gadamerian politics is a sterile and barren world in
which the material dirt of ideological politics and interests has
been washed off so that judges and rhetoricians do not get their
hands soiled with life as it is actually lived. But this sanitization
misrepresents the grubbiness and messiness of the real social
world.
-Allan C. Hutchinsonl°
Critical legal studies, admittedly now a complex and
variegated genre, originated with the simple demand by members
of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies that rigorous critical
theory replace the self-satisfied, incremental development of the
legal tradition promoted by the Legal Process school. At the
outset, critical legal scholarship primarily aimed to expose
contradictions and hypocrisy masquerading as principled legal
reasoning, thereby opening the possibility for a more authentic
legal practice. An incessant demand for "critique" was a not too
surprising feature of this aptly named movement. If "law is
politics" was the rallying slogan, then "politics can be critiqued and
reconfigured" was the underlying methodological assumption.
The emphasis on politics within critical legal studies is
evidenced in the prolific work of Allan Hutchinson. In the mid-
1980's, Hutchinson-often with co-author Tim Monahan-wrote
1 Allan C. Hutchinson, Work-In-Progress: Gadamer, Tradition, and the Common
Law, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1015,1051 (2000).
[Vol. 24:3
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passionately about the goals and prospects for critical legal theory.
In a review of James Boyd White's literary approach to legal
meaning, Hutchinson insists that White's elegant but complacent
hermeneutic approach must be replaced with critical insight.
White's readings of various historical and legal texts fail because
he "ignores the socio-economic determinants of the texts he
interprets," and Hutchinson emphasizes that seeking "to
understand a text apart from its political history is not only
suspicious, but impossible."11  Hutchinson argues that it is
necessary to expose the material determinants of textual
meanings-the social, economic, historical and political weight
that the text carries-if legal scholarship is to accomplish anything.
White's sophisticated, but middle-of-the-road, interpretive
approach is dangerous, in Hutchinson's view, because ultimately it
leads to one of two equally unsatisfactory results.
First, the interpreter may take the most radical hermeneutic
approaches to heart and conclude that texts are nothing but an
endless play of words having no fixed meaning. This textual
nihilism inevitably devolves into political nihilism because the
cultural reproduction that subtends political engagement is
regarded as an arbitrary and endlessly malleable event.'2
Hutchinson cites Sanford Levinson's articles as an example of this
tendency to adopt a superficially radical posture that in the end
leads to a regressive political paralysis born of a crude nihilism.'3
Under this nihilistic reading, the hermeneutical dismantling of
traditional accounts of language perversely leads to a relapse into
a traditionalist politics without utopian aspirations.
The second threat is evidenced by White's work. Having
debunked simple-minded traditionalist accounts of language,
White responds to the nihilistic abyss by pulling back from the
implications of his theory. White offers erudite interpretations
that purport to rise above localized contexts, but in fact White
unsurprisingly finds that his own prejudiced worldview is
confirmed by the texts he chooses to read. Hutchinson charges
that "by seeming to discover [humanistic] values embedded in the
texts, he naturalizes and universalizes his own preferred set of
" Allan C. Hutchinson, From Cultural Construction to Historical Deconstruction, 94
YALE L.J. 209, 221, 223 (1984).
12 Id. at 213. See Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, Law, Politics and the
Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 199, 236 (1984) (contending that critical legal studies scholarship runs the risk of
becoming frozen by its own critical methods, and noting that "their fledgling attempts at
social reconstruction have proven vulnerable to the same Critical sword that they wielded
to slay liberalism and Marxism").
13 Hutchinson, supra note 11, at 231-33.
20031
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beliefs as the eternal truths and ideals of cultural life."'4 Nihilism
is thwarted, then, only by an unjustified assertion of authority and
univocity. "To hold back the tide of imagined nihilism, pluralists,
as White's work evidences, smuggle in personal preference as
universal insight." 5
Critical legal studies offers a path between hermeneutical
nihilism and White's elegant form of whistling in the dark,
Hutchinson contends, because it accepts the historical character of
critique without accepting a crude historicism. Hutchinson looks
to the innovative work of Roberto Unger as a starting point for
developing a viable critical legal theory. Unger proposes a theory
of human personality that regards human experience as both
context-transcending and socially situated, thereby explaining how
legal doctrine is at once socially constitutive and subject to
critique. 6  Hutchinson's goal is to develop a sophisticated
explanation of how legal doctrine has real-world, constraining
effects that call for political action, while simultaneously describing
and exploiting a critical distance that permits us to dismantle
ideological constraints without succumbing to the conclusion that
all possible social arrangements are equally ideological and
therefore no more desirable than present ones. In the end,
Hutchinson believes that even Unger's work is too beholden to a
naturalistic account of the "context-transcending" features of
human existence, leading Hutchinson to fear that Unger also
invites nihilism by entirely discounting critical judgment and
human agency."
Hutchinson's writings during the early years of critical legal
studies clearly articulate the question that continues to confront
hermeneutical accounts of law today: if we accept the hermeneutic
commitment both to linguistic situated-ness and dialogic free play,
how do we avoid the twin dangers of political complacency on one
hand, and nihilistic despair on the other? Recently, Hutchinson
squarely posed this challenge to Gadamer's philosophical
hermeneutics."s  Responding to my claim that Gadamer's
invocation of Aristotelian natural law at a crucial juncture of Truth
and Method appears surprising but nevertheless aptly represents
the character of his philosophical hermeneutics, Hutchinson insists
that it is precisely this conservative attitude within philosophical
14 Id. at 223.
1- Id. at 228.
16 Id. at 234-35; Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 12, at 241.
17 See generally Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, The "Rights" Stuff-
Roberto Unger and Beyond, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1477 (1984).
18 See Hutchinson, supra note 10.
[Vol. 24:3
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hermeneutics that undermines effective critical theory. Extending
his earlier articles, Hutchinson charges that traditional approaches
to Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics are antithetical to
critical legal theory, thereby bringing the problem of developing a
critical hermeneutics into sharp relief.
In Law in Flux: Philosophical Hermeneutics, Legal
Argumentation, and the Natural Law Tradition,'9 I explain that
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics reinvigorates the classical
natural law tradition that is exemplified in Aristotle's analysis of a
dynamic and changeable "natural law" of human affairs.2"
Working from a model that connects Gadamer's hermeneutics
with Chaim Perelman's "new rhetoric," I suggest that the non-
theistic natural law philosophies of Lon Fuller and Lloyd Weinreb
provide descriptions of the hermeneutical-rhetorical character of
legal practice. Far from being retrograde, I argue that these
natural law accounts supplement the hermeneutical turn in legal
theory. I analyze Justice Souter's concurring opinion in the "right
to assisted suicide" cases2 as a practical example of the "law-in-
flux" paradox that motivates my attempt to outline a postmodern
natural law. Souter draws from Justice Harlan's famous analysis
that judges are bounded by tradition but that the "tradition is a
living thing,"22 and he accepts the necessity and responsibility in
constitutional adjudication to engage in "reasoned judgment"
rather than masking decisionmaking by referring to extratextual
19 Mootz, Law in Flux, supra note 8.
20 Gadamer refers to Aristotle's approach in setting up his important claim that legal
interpretation has exemplary significance for philosophical hermeneutics. Gadamer
writes:
For Aristotle, [the fact that natural law is not timeless and unchanging] is wholly
compatible with the fact that it is "natural" law.... [Unlike, for example, traffic
regulations, there are] things that do not admit of regulation by mere human
convention because the "nature of the thing" constantly asserts itself. Thus it is
quite legitimate to call such things "natural law." In that the nature of the thing
still allows some room for play, natural law is still changeable .... [Aristotle]
quite clearly explains that the best state "is everywhere one and the same," but it
is the same in a different way than "fire burns everywhere in the same way,
whether in Greece or in Persia."
[Aristotle's natural laws] are not norms to be found in the stars, nor do they
have an unchanging place in a natural moral universe, so that all that would be
necessary would be to perceive them. Nor are they mere conventions, but really
do correspond to the nature of the thing-except that the latter is always itself
determined in each case [contextually].
GADAMER, supra note 1, at 319-20.
21 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752-89 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
The companion case is Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
22 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 765 (Souter, J., concurring) (analyzing Justice Harlan's
famous dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)).
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(whether conceptual, historical or normative) absolutes.23
Hutchinson's detailed critique of my thesis is premised on the
inadequacy of philosophical hermeneutics, at least as promoted by
"conservative" theorists, to incorporate the lessons of critical legal
theory. Arguing that Gadamer's philosophical insights are
uncontroversial to some degree, Hutchinson correctly identifies
the issue as being how far to push these insights.24 He recoils from
my efforts to link a postmodern reading of Gadamer with certain
conceptions of natural law, characterizing it as "wild stuff" and
"exactly the wrong way to go" with Gadamer's hermeneutics.5
Although Hutchinson agrees that there is much in Gadamer's
writings that invites my "conservative" approach,26 he contends
that Gadamer can be fully radicalized only when we abandon the
false hope that there can be "bounded and neutral decision-
making" and recognize that "it is possible to understand law and
adjudication as thoroughly political without recommending its
complete abandonment. '27  When I connect hermeneutical
understanding to the reasoned elaboration of shared topoi,
Hutchinson charges, I domesticate the more radical hermeneutical
insight that we constantly are buffeted by multiple,
incommensurable traditions that always require legal actors to
make a political decision that cannot be avoided by reverting to a
"neutral" methodology of legal decisionmaking.
Hutchinson illustrates his thesis by providing an alternative
reading of Justice Souter's opinion in the right to assisted suicide
cases. Hutchinson concedes that Souter provides a
"jurisprudential tour de force" by openly accepting the non-
formalistic character of judicial decisionmaking. In the end,
though, Hutchinson argues that Souter hedges his bets by refusing
to pursue hermeneutical insights in an "unconditional and
uncompromising manner, '2 clinging to the belief "that there is a
viable way of resisting the critical claim that 'law is politics'. '29 In
short, Hutchinson criticizes Souter for refusing to acknowledge
openly that he is making a political decision about the existence of
a right to assisted suicide, and he rejects Souter's attempt to hide
behind the false hope that adjudication can proceed as a reasoned
23 Id. at 769-70.
21 See Hutchinson, supra note 10, at 1043.
25 Id. at 1049 & n.144. Hutchinson asserts that my attempt is a "vast improvement" on
Ronald Dworkin's more traditional approach, but nevertheless I read Gadamer's
hermeneutical insights through overly conservative lenses. Id. at 1048.
26 Id. at 1080.
27 Id. at 1016-17.
26 Id. at 1024.
29 Id. at 1031.
[Vol. 24:3
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and neutral articulation of what the Constitution means in a given
case. By choosing to recognize certain strands of our legal
tradition, Souter makes quintessentially political decisions that
reveal his personal political commitments. Hutchinson concludes
that Souter's
refusal to recognize the importance of those political
commitments means that [recourse to a supposed unitary legal]
tradition loses its vital quality as "a living thing" or, as I put it, a
work-in-progress. While Justice Souter, Mootz and others are
content to leave the sources and direction of its development to
some almost mystical historical volkgeist, I prefer to see it for
what it is-a heuristic device that does the bidding, no matter
how tentative and provisional, of its social artisans and judicial
arbiters."a
Hutchinson argues that a radical reading of Gadamer's
hermeneutical insights would topple this obeisance to a supposed
unitary tradition, and would counsel judges to act "less cowardly"
when they marshal the contradictory forces within our multiple,
contingent traditions in the service of progressive causes.31
Hutchinson's theme is simple: a critical perspective leads to the
understanding that all law is politics, and therefore facilitates a
more vigorous politics.
Hutchinson's critique motivates my project in this article. He
begins his argument by challenging Gadamer from a Nietzschean
perspective. He attributes Gadamer's conservative leanings to the
"fear that radicality must be synonymous with 'the nihilism that
Nietzsche prophesied,"' but he insists that Gadamer's fear is
wholly "unwarranted."32 Hutchinson pushes to radicalize
31) Id. at 1071.
31 Id. at 1079.
32 Id. at 1017 (quoting GADAMER, supra note 1, at xxxvii). Hutchinson completely
misreads Gadamer's text in this particular instance, but I concede that Hutchinson's point
is made fairly as to Gadamer's work taken as a whole. In the passage in question, which
occurs at the very end of the Foreword to the second edition of Truth and Method,
Gadamer is addressing the criticism that his book is too recuperative of tradition and
therefore lacks critical bite. Gadamer defends his bias by noting the (then) overpowering
influence of techno-scientific consciousness that threatens to destroy any connection with
tradition. He writes:
[w]hen science expands into a total technocracy and thus brings on the "cosmic
night" of the "forgetfulness of being," the nihilism that Nietzsche prophesied,
then may one not gaze at the last fading light of the sun setting in the evening
sky, instead of turning around to look for the first shimmer of its return?
GADAMER, supra note 1, at xxxviii. In other words, Gadamer aligns himself with
Nietzsche's efforts to overcome the nihilism that is the ultimate product of modern
consciousness, and is not in any way impugning Nietzsche for being nihilistic.
Nevertheless, Hutchinson has ample grounds to argue that Gadamer might fear the
excesses of Nietzsche's critical approach, and that one of Gadamer's objectives is to avoid
the more radical elements of Nietzsche's response to the threats of modern consciousness.
In the quoted passage, Gadamer chooses to look back at the fading twilight of
2003)
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Gadamer's attack on plain meaning and mechanical
decisionmaking, and he regards this radicalization as a prerequisite
of political engagement rather than an invitation to political
nihilism. Because Hutchinson grounds his critical theory in the
gritty political encounters of everyday life, he presents a more
pointed challenge to Gadamer's hermeneutics than Habermas's
philosophy. Rather than asserting that Gadamer has missed a
quasi-transcendental reality that subtends hermeneutical practices,
Hutchinson contends that Gadamer backs away from the radical
implications that follow from Gadamer's description of these
hermeneutical practices. In other words, Hutchinson brings a
critical challenge to bear on Gadamer's philosophy in a much
more unsettling, Nietzschean manner.
I will argue not only that Gadamer's philosophy can meet the
challenge of critical legal theory, but that philosophical
hermeneutics provides important guidance for Hutchinson and
other critics. In Truth and Method, Gadamer set himself the task
of recovering the experience of truth that occurs outside the
narrow technical-empirical model of the natural sciences;
consequently, the primary thrust of his philosophy is recuperative
and restorative. Nevertheless, Gadamer makes clear that
recuperation and restoration are critical activities that always hold
the potential for a fundamental shift in perspective and thinking. I
agree with Hutchinson's efforts to radicalize Gadamer's
philosophy in order to compel an admission that "law is politics,"
but I would respond with a Gadamerian reading that questions
whether politics is really as contingent, subject-centered and
idiosyncratic as Hutchinson would have it. Nietzsche is the correct
focus for an examination of the potential for a critical
hermeneutics, but I will demonstrate that Nietzschean critique is
better accommodated by Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics
than by the critical legal studies approach adopted by Hutchinson,
which ultimately endorses a more subject-driven politics.
1I. NIETZSCHEAN CRITIQUE: ONTOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVISM
AND RHETORICAL KNOWLEDGE
I caught this insight on the way and quickly seized the rather
poor words that were closest to hand to pin it down lest it fly
reasonableness, rather than joining with Nietzsche in anticipating the dawn of a new form
of reasonableness. Compare FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, DAYBREAK (R. J. Hollingdale
trans., 1982), with FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Twilight of the Idols, in THE PORTABLE
NIETZSCHE (Walter Kaufmann ed. & trans., 1968).
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away again. And now it has died of these arid words and shakes
and flaps in them-and I hardly know any more when I look at it
how I could ever have felt so happy when I caught this bird.
-Friedrich Nietzsche33
Nietzsche is a challenging and enigmatic philosopher who
resists easy summarization. Nietzsche scholars vigorously advance
contradictory interpretations of his work, making it all the more
difficult to define "Nietzschean critique." This situation stems in
part from the fact that modern Nietzsche scholarship is indebted
both to Martin Heidegger, who argued that Nietzsche's "will to
power" represented the culmination of the Western metaphysical
tradition, and to Jacques Derrida, who argued that Nietzsche is a
pioneer in overcoming the metaphysical tradition. In recent years,
philosophers in the analytic tradition have proposed a naturalistic
reading of Nietzsche's philosophy that represents a more
fundamental challenge to the competing continental approaches.
These interpretive disputes cannot be resolved by reading
Nietzsche's texts more carefully. Diverse readings of Nietzsche's
work inevitably follow from the non-traditional (and often
aphoristic) nature of his published works; the cumulative, self-
referential, playful and ironic qualities of his texts; and the
extensive notebooks of unpublished writings that are available to
scholars. Turning to Nietzsche for philosophical clarification, it
would seem, is more than a bit like bungee jumping off a tower in
order to ease one's feeling of vertigo.
In light of these complexities, I do not pretend to adjudicate
the many contentious battles among Nietzsche scholars with the
goal of definitively characterizing Nietzsche's work. I do not have
the training and temperament for, nor sufficient interest in, such a
curious project. My far more modest, and-dare I say-more
Nietzschean, goal is to develop a model of Nietzschean critique
that satisfies two requirements. First, the model must plausibly be
reconciled with Nietzsche's texts and some of the prominent
strands in contemporary secondary scholarship. Second, the
model must provide substantial guidance in the project of building
a critical hermeneutics that overcomes the facial conservatism of
Gadamer's philosophy. I do not presume that my model of
Nietzschean critique provides a comprehensive account of the
significance that Nietzsche's philosophy holds for legal theory. I
claim only that my model of Nietzsche's critical activity provides
an important resource for questioning whether hermeneutics can
33 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE Book IV para. 298, at 239 (Walter
Kaufmann trans., 1974) [hereinafter NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE].
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accommodate critical theory.
My method for constructing a model of Nietzschean critique is
mediative and meliorative, in that I seek to find some common
ground in contemporary Nietzsche scholarship. 34  My model
derives from two prominent interpretations of Nietzsche: on one
hand, analytic philosophers have characterized Nietzsche as a
naturalist whose principal aim is to overcome the metaphysical
nonsense embodied in religion and traditional (especially moral)
philosophy; on the other hand, continental philosophers have
emphasized that Nietzsche regards all knowledge as perspectival,
and therefore not reducible to correspondence with an objective,
free-standing, natural reality. Naturalism provides Nietzsche with
a standard by which to judge the metaphysics of modernity, while
perspectivism is the means by which Nietzsche deconstructs the
Enlightenment conception of the knowing subject. A
complementary reading of these two Nietzschean themes holds the
promise of generating a model of critical theory that nevertheless
fits comfortably with Gadamer's hermeneutical ontology of
understanding.
My model is principally indebted to the Continental readings
of Nietzsche by Christoph Cox in Nietzsche: Naturalism and
Interpretation35 and Wayne Klein in Nietzsche and the Promise of
Philosophy,36 and also the analytical reading by Steven Hales and
Rex Welshon in Nietzsche's Perspectivism.37 Each book offers a
nuanced and integrative interpretation of Nietzsche, from which I
draw the following guiding themes: (1) Nietzsche grounds his
critical activity in a naturalistic account, but he regards nature as
irremediably perspectival; (2) Nietzsche claims that his critiques
are "true" only according to the perspectival ontology and
epistemology generated by his naturalistic account; and (3)
Nietzsche's critical activity is aesthetic and rhetorical, rather than
representational and demonstrative. My model preserves the
radical character of Nietzschean critique without surrendering to a
simple-minded nihilism that ultimately would eviscerate the
critical bite of Nietzsche's work.
34 Cf. FRED R. DALLMAYR, CRITICAL ENCOUNTERS: BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND
POLITICS 14 (1987) (arguing that the competing interpretations of Nietzsche by Heidegger
and Derrida are both legitimate interpretations if we regard Nietzsche as being "riveted
between conflicting paradigms or modes of discourse," and if we acknowledge that
Nietzsche's "post-Cartesian Cartesianism can help illuminate our own intellectual
meandering between past and future").
35 CHRISTOPH Cox, NIETZSCHE: NATURALISM AND INTERPRETATION (1999).
36 WAYNE KLEIN, NIETZSCHE AND THE PROMISE OF PHILOSOPHY (1997).
37 STEVEN D. HALES & REX WELSHON, NIETZSCHE'S PERSPECTIVISM (2000).
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A. Nietzsche's Naturalism: A Perspectivist Ontology
Nietzsche's virulent attacks on Christianity and metaphysics
often are presented in naturalistic terms: he criticizes religion and
philosophy for promoting fictions and turning away from real life.
Several of Nietzsche's later texts "lend support to the view that
Nietzsche essentializes the concept of life in order to employ it
normatively as a standard against which different forms of social
organization and morality can be measured and judged."38 When
appealing to the natural world as the standard by which to criticize
the mystifications of his day, Nietzsche often celebrates the role of
the natural sciences in overcoming the false rationality of
metaphysics.39 In The Antichrist, Nietzsche indicts religion because
it obscures reality,4" and his famous announcement of the "death of
God" places man back in the natural world as a creature with no
special ontological status.4' Nietzsche characterizes the natural
"reality" that has been denied by religion and philosophy as "will
to power." In Beyond Good and Evil, he insists that "we must
beware of superficiality and get to the bottom of the matter,
resisting all sentimental weakness" in order to describe the
essential characteristics of life; he concludes that "life simply is will
to power."42 In short, religion and philosophy reject the real world
38 KLEIN, supra note 36, at 148.
39 See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, "Reason" in Philosophy, in Twilight of the Idols, in
THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE (Walter Kaufmann ed. & trans., 1954) [hereinafter
NIETZSCHE, Twilight of the Idols]. Nietzsche mocks the philosophical assumption that the
senses deceive us about the nature of the true and abiding world, exempting only
Heraclitus from his scorn because Heraclitus trusted his senses when they revealed that
reality is "multiplicity and change." Id. paras. 1-2, at 480. He concludes: "Today we
possess science precisely to the extent to which we have decided to accept the testimony of
the senses-to the extent to which we sharpen them further, arm them, and have learned
to think them through. The rest is miscarriage and not-yet-science .. " Id. para. 3, at 481.
See also FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, We Scholars, in BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL para. 204, at
311 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1966), in which Nietzsche notes the displacement of
philosophy by science. Nietzsche suggests that science may be all the more amazing to us
because it appears to deliver an unwavering and predictable baseline in the face of the
modern recognition of the "fickleness of everything human." NIETZSCHE, THE GAY
SCIENCE, supra note 33, Book I para. 46, at 111.
40 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, The Antichrist para. 15, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE
581-82 (Walter Kaufmann ed. & trans., 1954) [hereinafter NIETZSCHE, The Antichrist]:
In Christianity neither morality nor religion has even a single point of contact
with reality .... Once the concept of 'nature' had been invented as the opposite
of 'God,' 'natural' had to become a synonym of 'reprehensible': this whole world
of [religious] fiction is rooted in hatred of the natural (of reality!); it is the
expression of a profound vexation at the sight of reality.
Id.
41 COx, supra note 35, at 74-75.
42 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, What is Noble, in BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL para. 259, at
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of nature, which is will to power.
Several analytic philosophers have emphasized that
Nietzsche's naturalism undercuts Nietzsche's apparent celebration
of radical indeterminacy and the impossibility of truth.43 They
argue that Nietzsche's naturalism demonstrates that he is a
committed realist who regards the techno-empirical sciences as an
appropriate means for overcoming the mystifications of religion
and philosophy and gaining a better understanding of the real
(natural) world. In response to continental philosophers who
emphasize Nietzsche's numerous references to the radically
interpretive character of life, they argue that Nietzsche's rhetorical
excesses must be disregarded as inconsistent, if not incoherent,
surplusage. In the end, the narrow analytic reading of Nietzsche
paints him as a harbinger of a relentless scientific consciousness
that attends only to the real world, which is to say a perceptible
and empirical world, and ceases useless speculation about
metaphysical truths."
If Nietzschean critique were nothing more than a realist
naturalism, his work clearly would have little relevance to the
project of defining a critical hermeneutics. However, this narrow
reading of Nietzsche's naturalism is accomplished only at the cost
of sharply limiting the texts deemed worthy of consideration and
disregarding much of the content of those texts. Although
supported by textual evidence and certainly plausible, the narrow
analytic reading is not compelled. This reading not only cuts
against a significant portion of his writing, it also undermines
Nietzsche's significance as a serious philosopher who rejected a
simple-minded realism but nevertheless found ample resources for
vigorous critique. Recent commentators from both the analytic
and continental traditions have rejected the narrow analytic
reading by re-situating Nietzsche's naturalism in his entire body of
work and approaching his philosophy in a broader and more
integrative manner. Rather than attempting to "save" Nietzsche
from incoherence according to pre-existing realist prejudices, these
scholars attempt to understand how Nietzsche's professed
203 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1966) [hereinafter NIETZSCHE, What is Noble]. See also
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, On the Prejudices of Philosophers. in BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL
para. 13, at 21 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1966) (contending that "life itself is will to power"
and regarding the claimed instinct for self-preservation as a "superfluous teleological"
principle that refers to a frequent result of will to power) and FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE,
The Free Spirit, in BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL para. 36, at 115 (Walter Kaufmann trans.,
1966) (essentializing will to power).
13 Certainly the most prominent example is MAUDEMARIE CLARK, NIETZSCHE ON
TRUTH AND PHI LOSOPH Y (1990).
44 There certainly is textual support for this claim. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE,
THE GAY SCIENCE, supra note 33, Book IV para. 319, at 253; id. para. 335, at 263.
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naturalism can coexist with his perspectivism. Under their
reading, while it is true that Nietzsche criticizes religion and
philosophy against the standard of natural reality, Nietzsche
regards natural reality as deeply perspectival and interpretive.
Nietzsche's assessment of science is far too ambivalent to
compel a realist reading of his naturalism. The emergence of
science coincides with the death of God and the movement away
from religion, but Nietzsche regards much of modern science as
theology by other means. " Rather than overcoming the "ascetic
ideal" expressed in the religious and metaphysical retreat from
nature, science intensifies the denial of nature by reducing it to
objects that have causal-mechanistic relationships open to our
perspicacious description.46 Nietzsche criticizes the sober realists
who believe that the world is arrayed before their detached gaze
and who refuse to acknowledge the "secret and inextinguishable
drunkenness" of life.47 Consequently, Nietzsche regarded the
science of his day as the culmination of the Western metaphysical
tradition that threatens to bring on a "midnight" of nihilism, but
he believed that this, in turn, would set the stage for a new dawn in
which we can affirm the death of God rather than seek a surrogate
45 Cox, supra note 35, at 16-27.
46 Nietzsche attacks the natural scientists for supposing that their interpretive schemas,
in particular causation, are objective features of the real world.
One should not wrongly reify "cause" and "effect," as the natural scientists do
(and whoever, like them, now "naturalizes" in his thinking), according to the
prevailing mechanical doltishness.... In the "in-itself" there is nothing of
"causal connections," of "necessity," or of "psychological non-freedom"; there
the effect does not follow the cause, there is no rule of "law." It is we alone who
have devised cause, sequence, for-each-other, relativity, constraint, number, law,
freedom, motive, and purpose; and when we project and mix this symbol world
into things as if it existed "in itself," we act once more as we have always acted-
mythologically.
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, On the Prejudices of Philosophers, in BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL
para. 21, at 29 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1966) [hereinafter NIETZSCHE, On the
Prejudices]. Nietzsche makes this point forcefully in the opening sections of Book Three
of The Gay Science. Although God is dead, Nietzsche writes, we must now engage in a
new struggle to vanquish his "shadow." NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE, supra note 33,
Book III para. 108, at 167. He then cautions against regarding nature as an organism or a
machine and asks, "When will all these shadows of God cease to darken our minds?
When will we complete our de-deification of nature? When may we begin to "naturalize"
humanity in terms of a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature?" Id. para. 109, at
167. Immediately following this question are three sections in which Nietzsche locates the
origins of knowledge, logic and causality in error, illogic and flux, id. para. 110, at 169; id.
para. 112, at 172, indicating that Nietzsche does not equate nature with the object of
modern scientific consciousness. See also id. Book IV para. 300, at 240 (contending that
magic, alchemy and astrology are preludes to contemporary science). This is confirmed in
Book Five, added in 1887, in the sections entitled, How we, too, are still pious, and
"Science" as a prejudice. Id. Book V para. 344, at 280; Id. para. 373, at 334.
47 NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE, supra note 33, Book II para. 57, at 121.
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in science.4" This new day would be the advent of the gay science
that Nietzsche heralded: a joyous affirmation of the human
condition.
Nietzsche grounds his critique in nature, but he rejects the
subject/object dualisms that defined the scientific worldview of his
day in favor of "will to power,"-the view that all of nature is
engaged in ongoing, active interpretation. 49 Nietzsche proposes a
radically new holistic ontology to replace the "theological"
ontology of the nineteenth-century natural sciences." Naturalism
and interpretivism coexist, then, by recognizing that:
if will to power is the naturalistic theory par excellence, and if
will to power essentially involves interpretation, the naturalist is
led to assert the primacy and irreducibility of interpretation....
In short, for Nietzsche, the natural world is fundamentally
interpretive. There is no world other than the natural and
nothing outside the interpretive web that constitutes this
natural world.5
Nietzsche never provided a detailed explanation of will to
power, but Hales and Welshon argue that an analytic reading of
his texts makes clear that he was proposing a radically alternative
"perspectivist ontology of power."52 Under this ontology, humans
are not interpretive animals that "create" the world according to
their desires, but rather are the most complex beings in a deeply
interpretive play of forces that includes all of nature. 3  Cox
concurs:
Against all realisms, Nietzsche maintains that every ontology is
48 COX, supra note 35, at 27. See also GIANNI VATTIMO, NIETZSCHE: AN
INTRODUCTION 43-58 (Nicholas Martin trans., 2001) (1985) (Explaining that Nietzsche
challenged the positivist accounts of science at the same time that he acknowledged the
powerful effect of science within contemporary culture, leading Nietzsche to adopt more
nuanced views that connected the activities of art and science).
49 ld. at 214.
51 Id. at 221.
51 Id. at 241-42. Gianni Vattimo echoes this hermeneutical reading of "will to power":
If one may say this, the Will to Power is something hermeneutic, something
engaged in interpreting. The struggle between the opposing tendencies of a
multiplicity of wills is above all a struggle between competing interpretations, as
that fragment concerning European nihilism shows.... Yet the Will to Power is
also hermeneutic in another sense: because it sees the world as a game of
competing appearances and perspectives, it is itself one theory among others, an
interpretation and nothing else. Nietzsche concedes this point explicitly at the
end of an aphorism in Beyond Good and Evil: "'Assuming this too is only
interpretation [... ] well, so much the better."' (BGE §22, 3t).
VATTIMO, supra note 48, at 124.
52 HALES & WELSHON, supra note 37, at 58. Although some analytic commentators
choose to ignore the corrupted, posthumous text Will to Power, Hales and Welshon
responsibly use the unpublished materials in support of what they find anticipated in his
published texts. Id. at 62-63.
-3 Id. at 63-65.
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the construction of an interpretation and that no world would
remain over after the subtraction of every interpretation....
Nietzsche short-circuits the distinction between idealism and
realism by dissolving the poles of subject and object into the
unified field of interpretation or will to power. 4
The perspectival character of will to power is reflected in
Nietzsche's thoroughly perspectival accounts of the self" and the
world of objects. 6 These accounts do not devolve into nihilistic
relativism precisely because they are so radical. In Nietzsche's
account there is no autonomous self who can choose to impose an
interpretation as a matter of whim or fancy, since selves always
already are the products of and proponents of a thick network of
interpretations.57
Nietzsche delivers naturalistic critiques of Christianity and
metaphysics, but he is criticizing their abandonment of a natural
reality that is deeply interpretive. The absolute and binary world
proposed by these fables is a complete abstraction from the real
world, where knowledge is gained because of, and not in spite of,
perspectivity. This point is most clearly expressed by Nietzsche in
the celebrated passage from On the Genealogy of Morals, in which
he mocks the philosophical manifestation of an ascetic hostility to
life: "To cease believing in one's own self, to deny one's own
"reality"-what a triumph! ... " In opposition to this ascetic ideal,
Nietzsche advocates that philosophers embrace the interpretive
character of nature, in order to usher in a new
"objectivity"... understood not as "disinterested
contemplation" (which is a non-concept and a nonsense), but as
54 Cox, supra note 35, at 163.
55
Nietzsche not only views the subject as a multiplicity of micro-interpretations
and -perspectives; he also views the subject itself as a macro-interpretation. The
point is simply that, for Nietzsche, interpretation goes all the way down and all
the way up. Rather than positing the subject as something outside the realm of
interpretation, something that stands behind and fabricates interpretations,
Nietzsche maintains that the subject itself is fabricated by and as an
interpretation.
Id. at 138-39.
56 Nietzsche regards the world of objects as a radical flux of power relations that is
channeled by human activities into a manageable reality: "objects are what they are only
under a particular description, for a particular perspective or interpretation." Id. at 154
(criticizing the attempt by Brian Leiter and others to portray Nietzsche as a realist).
57 As Cox explains, Nietzsche does not
deny the reality of the external world or claim that we can make interpretations,
worlds, subjects, and object any way we please. He understands that there are
always constraints upon our worldmaking. He only refuses to grant that there is
some pre-given world that can or should ultimately serve as that constraint.
Rather, what reality there is and what constraints there are, Nietzsche argues,
are provided solely by the dominant, existing interpretations.
Id. at 159-60.
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the capacity to have all the arguments for and against at one's
disposal and to suspend or implement them at will: so that one
can exploit that very diversity of perspectives and affective
interpretations in the interests of knowledge. From now on, my
dear philosophers, let us beware of the dangerous old
conceptual fable which posited a "pure, will-less, painless,
timeless knowing subject", let us beware of the tentacles of such
contradictory concepts as "pure reason," "absolute spirituality,"
"knowledge in itself";-for these always ask us to imagine an
eye which is impossible to imagine, an eye which supposedly
looks out in no particular direction, an eye which supposedly
either restrains or altogether lacks the active powers of
interpretation which first make seeing into something-for
here, then, a nonsense and non-concept is demanded of the eye.
Perspectival seeing is the only kind of seeing there is,
perspectival "knowing" the only kind of "knowing"; and the
more feelings about a matter which we allow to come to
expression, the more eyes, different eyes through which we are
able to view this same matter, the more complete our
"conception" of it, our "objectivity", will be.58
The falsifications introduced by the ascetic ideal, as it is manifested
in religion, philosophy, and even science, can be overcome only by
affirming that perspectivism is the nature of reality.
B. The (Non-Metaphysical) Truth of Ontological Perspectivism
Nietzsche's naturalism grounds his critique, but by endorsing
a perspectival account of nature he courts obvious difficulties. For
example, Brian Leiter advances the narrow analytic reading by
arguing that a radically perspectivist ontology undermines
Nietzsche's claim that his critiques provide epistemically privileged
access to reality. 9 The challenge is straightforward: Nature can't
provide a standard against which to judge the metaphysical
tradition if nature is merely a contest of perspectives, none of
which can claim epistemic superiority by virtue of corresponding
more accurately to an independent world. Leiter concludes that
we must take Nietzsche's optical analogy in the Genealogy quite
literally, which leads him to declare that Nietzsche is a pluralist
58 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS Third Essay para. 12, at
98 (Douglas Smith trans., 1996) (1887).
" Brian Leiter, Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals, in NIETZSCHE,
GENEALOGY, MORALITY: ESSAYS ON NIETZSCHE'S GENEALOGY OF MORALS 334, 339
(Richard Schacht ed., 1994) (arguing that one can avoid this dilemma only by abandoning
Nietzsche's epistemic claims, by reducing them to rhetorical flourish, or (with Leiter) by
revising the account of Nietzsche's naturalism to accord with his epistemic claims).
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who nevertheless recognizes an epistemic hierarchy. Leiter argues
that our ordinary experience of sight teaches us that there is no
single, acontextual, all-encompassing view of an object-the
"God's-eye" view from nowhere-but, nevertheless, that some
views are better than others, and multiple views of an object are
even more likely to yield an accurate conception of that object.'
"On this position knowledge is possible, though never complete,
and it always requires a plurality of interpretive perspectives."61
Nietzsche's naturalism is preserved by reading his doctrine of
perspectivism as an account of the limitations of human perception
and cognition in processing the real world.
Although certainly plausible, this reading is not easily borne
out by Nietzsche's texts and is made possible only by virtue of the
loaded question to which it responds. Leiter asks whether the
"optical situation" referenced by Nietzsche in the Genealogy is
more closely analogous to radically perspectivist readings of
Nietzsche or to more traditional, neo-Kantian readings of
Nietzsche, but he surreptitiously constructs the "optical situation"
in a manner that answers the question beforehand. Leiter
wrongfully assumes "a pre-given subject who has perspectives or
interpretations" of a determinate, pre-given object.62 But as
explained above, Nietzsche's perspectivist ontology undermines
such an account of "ordinary" vision; indeed, that is the very point
of his perspectivism. Specifically, Nietzsche embraces a dynamic
and interpretive account of supposedly "pure" perception,
affirming the deeply constitutive nature of perspectivity. 6 The
6 Id. at 345-47.
61 Id. at 351.
62 Cox, supra note 35, at 121.
63 Nietzsche argues that science does not proceed by first acknowledging new
perceptions, but that often new perceptions are not possible until after the "rash
hypotheses," "fictions," "the good dumb will to 'believe'," and "the lack of mistrust and
patience" have set the stage. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Natural History of Morals, in
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL para. 192, at 104-05 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1966). He
explains:
Our eye finds it more comfortable to respond to a given stimulus by reproducing
once more an image that it has produced many times before, instead of
registering what is different and new in an impression. The latter would require
more strength, more "morality." Hearing something new is embarrassing and
difficult for the ear ... Even in the midst of the strangest experiences we still do
the same: we make up the major part of the experience and can scarcely be
forced not to contemplate some event as its "inventors." All this means:
basically and from time immemorial we are-accustomed to lying. Or to put it
more virtuously and hypocritically, in short, more pleasantly: one is much more
of an artist than one knows.
Id. at 105. In this passage Nietzsche clearly distinguishes perception for sensory stimuli,
although he does so in the context of noting the conservatism that follows from our
interpretive nature: our prejudiced perceptual forestructure, one might say. See also
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passage from the Genealogy supports this reading, since Nietzsche
rejects both the idea that eyes are agents that restrain
interpretation, and the idea that eyes are purely passive
instruments. Instead, he affirms that the eyes participate in "the
active powers of interpretation which first make seeing into
something." Moreover, a reasonable reading of Nietzsche's texts
supports the conclusion that he makes the doctrine of
perspectivism central to his ontology and epistemology. As Hales
and Welshon dryly conclude in the course of their analytic reading
of Nietzsche, "[i]f the choice is between relying on Nietzsche's
Nachlafl to develop a robust theory of ontological perspectivism or
amputating this ontology and turning Nietzsche into a retrograde
Kantian, the former is surely preferable."'
Leiter promotes the narrow analytic reading because he
believes that Nietzsche is too demonstrably committed to the truth
of his critiques to endorse a radically perspectivist ontology that
would rob his philosophy of a claim to epistemic privilege. But the
issue is more complex than Leiter allows, in that it is unnecessary
to force a choice between epistemic nihilism and a realist epistemic
hierarchy. Hales and Welshon carefully develop the thesis that
perspectivism is the core of Nietzsche's philosophy, without
concluding that Nietzsche abandons truth claims. They explain
that Nietzsche adopts a "weak perspectivism"-holding only that
there are some statements that are true in some perspectives while
false in others-rather than a "strong perspectivism"-under
which every statement would be true in at least one perspective
and false in another.65 Consequently, Nietzsche allows that there
may be some statements, admittedly not many, that are true "in all
human perspectives, statements that are true for all humans no
matter what else is true in their perspective."6 The crucial point
for Nietzsche is that even absolute truths, such as logic or certain
causal relationships, are not validated by direct correspondence to
NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE, supra note 33, Book Ill para. 114, at 173-74 ("As soon as
we see a new image, we immediately construct it with the aid of all our previous
experiences, depending on the degree of our honesty and justice. All experiences are
moral experiences, even in the realm of sense perception."). See KLEIN, supra note 36, at
71:
One of the aims of Nietzsche's genealogy of the word is to criticize this naively
held belief [that words serve as a neutral medium which mediates our experience
of a world of pre-existing and pre-linguistic objectsl by demonstrating that even
those experiences that we consider most basic, tactile sensation for example, are
not immediately given but are always already determined by linguistic structures
such as metonymy, metaphor and synecdoche.
Id.
Tm HALES & WELSHON, supra note 37, at 77.
6. Id. at 15-36.
Id. at 34.
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a world-in-itself, but instead are only perspectivally true. 7
Under this reading, then, Nietzsche can claim without self-
contradiction that his perspectivist ontology-designated as will to
power-is true, even that it is absolutely true. In other words,
Nietzsche can plausibly advance a thesis of ontological
perspectivism at the same time that he insists on epistemological
perspectivism.68
Hence, perspectivist ontology can be absolutely true, if we are
careful to insist that an absolute truth is a truth across, rather
than outside of, human perspectives. So, perspectivist ontology
can be absolutely true even though weak perspectivism is true
of many other sentences. So, given that the version of
perspectivism attributable to Nietzsche is weak perspectivism
and the relevant perspectives are human perspectives, there is
no self-referential inconsistency between the absolute truth of
perspectivist ontology and alethic perspectivism.69
Perspectivism provides an ontological account that is true in all
human perspectives, just as the principles of logic or the laws of
67 "It is precisely extra-perspectival truth and non-truth that Nietzsche ridicules and
rejects outright: no matter how essential a belief is for the preservation and enhancement
of life-no matter even if it is absolutely true-it still is not extra-perspectivally true." Id.
at 35. For example, Nietzsche's critique of logic is not that logic is not absolutely true, but
only that we misread the logic that girds our grammar by hypothesizing a full-blown realist
metaphysics that posits objective entities. Id. at 37-56. Similarly, Nietzsche's critique of
causality is not intended to deny certain realities that he designates as will to power, but
rather to tear down the reification of mechanical causes and effects as perspective-
independent laws that take God's place. Id. at 85-110.
Gianni Vattimo makes this same point in connection with Nietzsche's critique of
morality as the sublimation of all too human factors, arguing that Nietzsche's apparent
claim to uncover what is really going on can be read consistently with his deconstructive
critique.
To detect something like a "drive to preservation" or "the intention to achieve
pleasure" at the root of morality is not the same as identifying the source of a
moral value in stable, fixed structures of Being-in other words in those
structures which since time immemorial have provided traditional metaphysical
or religious morality with a justification for its prescriptive systems. The "drive
to preservation" and "the intention to achieve pleasure" are malleable forces
which permit us to view morality as a diachronic process.
VATFIMO, supra note 48, at 65.
68 Hales and Welshon explain the difference between these epistemological
perspectivism and ontological perspectivism:
According to epistemological perspectivism, objective knowledge is vitiated by
the perspectivity of epistemic capacities and the perspectival constitution of the
object of knowledge. Ontological perspectivism claims that there are no facts in
the world to which ideas and propositions could possibly correspond, even if,
counterfactually, epistemic capacities were not perspectival. Since each
quantum of will to power is a perspective and perspectives are loci of
interpretation, there exists nothing but loci of interpretation, and hence it is not
possible that there be an interpretation-independent world.
HALES & WELSHON, supra note 37, at 202.
69 Id. at 199.
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causation are absolutely true, but the truth of Nietzsche's ontology
is not established by its correspondence with a perspective-
independent world, for no such world exists.
Wayne Klein proposes a similar, although less satisfactory,
solution to the alleged incoherence in Nietzsche's philosophy.
Klein emphasizes that Nietzsche's critique of morality is not
undermined by his critique of truth for the simple reason that
Nietzsche does not reject truth but instead undertakes a radical
reinterpretation of truth." "What is being denied-if one wishes
to employ this vocabulary-is the coherence of the
correspondence theory of truth, not the concept of truth itself."'
Truth is secured with a genealogical inquiry rather than by
assuring the correspondence of statements with objective reality.
Ultimately, Klein suggests that Nietzsche's "will to power" is not
an essentialist account of nature, but instead is offered as a
genealogical interpretation of nature. Klein's approach tends to
undermine Nietzsche's claim to be offering a valid interpretation
of the cultural and intellectual situation in which he found himself,
although it is certainly correct to characterize Nietzsche's
naturalism as an "interpretation" to the extent that Nietzsche
argues that nature is perspectival.73 Hales and Welshon carefully
demonstrate how Nietzschean critique can consistently claim to be
more than just another interpretation offered to a chaotic
marketplace of ideas, and thus their approach provides a more
integrative account that respects Nietzsche's assertions of truth.
There is a reasonable solution to the apparent contradiction
between Nietzsche's claim that his perspectivist ontology of "will
to power" is true and can serve as a standard against which to
criticize social institutions and traditions, and his claim that all
70 KLEIN, supra note 36, at 59-60.
71 Id. at 74.
72 Id. at 156 (characterizing "will to power" as "one way among others of describing
nature, a form of description that Nietzsche recognizes as explicitly metaphorical").
73 Klein correctly contextualizes Nietzsche's various essentialist claims about "will to
power" in Beyond Good and Evil by referring to an early section in which Nietzsche
challenges those who would draw democratic lessons from "nature." Id. at 151-56.
Nietzsche suggests that this "interpretation" of nature is easily countered by an account of
nature as "will to power," and that will to power might also mean that the world "has a
,necessary' and 'calculable' course, not because laws obtain in it, but because they are
absolutely lacking, and every power draws its ultimate consequences at every moment."
NIETZSCHE, On the Prejudices, supra note 46, para. 22, at 30-31. By positing will to power
as an alternate interpretation, Nietzsche invites the obvious question: "Supposing that this
also is only interpretation-and you will be eager enough to make this objection?-well,
so much the better." Id. But acknowledging that his ontology is an interpretation is not
tantamount to acknowledging that it has the same truth status as any other interpretation.
Klein's rhetorical reading of Nietzsche, which effectively corrects the apparent slide to
nihilism, is discussed in the next section.
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knowledge and truth is perspectival. Commentators generally
have given emphasis to one of these claims in an effort to
eliminate the charge that Nietzsche cannot press both claims
without being incoherent. On one hand, Hales and Welshon agree
with Maudemarie Clark that Nietzsche is not a nihilistic relativist,
but they disagree with her strategy (followed by Leiter) of
watering down Nietzsche's epistemological perspectivism to a
minimalist correspondence theory of truth in order to make his
theory consistent.74 On the other hand, they also reject John
Richardson's solution of construing Nietzsche's ontological claims
as potentially being false in some perspectives in order to preserve
his perspectival epistemology without contradiction.75  The
paradox of Nietzsche's thoroughgoing perspectivism serving as the
standard for his naturalistic critiques turns out to be a
comprehensible and comprehensive reading of Nietzsche's
philosophy. Put more forcefully by Christoph Cox, Nietzsche's
naturalism and perspectivism can stand only if they stand together,
because they supplement and qualify the tendency to excess that
each doctrine invites.7"
C. Nietzschean Critique as an Aesthetic and Rhetorical Practice
Even if it is plausible and coherent to characterize
Nietzschean critique as a practice of criticizing cultural
phenomenon against the standard of our "perspectival nature,"
substantial difficulties remain. It is not clear that Nietzsche has
successfully identified a standard for discriminating between
competing critical interpretations that claim to uncover a
naturalistic standard for critique that is true across human
perspectives. For example, when a religious fundamentalist
criticizes the emergence of gay rights as a decadent affront to
man's heterosexual "nature," is the fundamentalist's critique
epistemologically equivalent to Nietzsche's perspectivist ontology
and his resulting critique of religion? If so, critical inquiry is
overcome by the relativism that Nietzsche clearly rejected. It is no
74 HALES & WELSHON, supra note 37, at 192-93.
75 Id. at 193-95.
76
Taken together, these doctrines tread between relativism and dogmatism
without yielding to either extreme. The apparent relativism of perspectivism is
held in check by Nietzsche's naturalism, which offers the doctrines of will to
power and becoming in place of all theological interpretations.., yet ones that
are better by naturalistic methods.
Cox, supra note 35, at 106.
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answer to state that Nietzsche prevails in this dispute because he
works from man's perspectival nature rather than from
metaphysical and religious myths, because the fundamentalist is
putting into question the presumption that Nietzsche's ontology
and epistemology are the appropriate standard. The
fundamentalist appeals to the (divinely-ordered) world-in-itself
and sees no need for argumentation. In contrast, Nietzsche's
perspectival ontology appears to preclude him from successfully
rebutting fundamentally inconsistent naturalistic accounts,
including religiously-inspired natural law theories.
These questions bring us to the heart of Nietzschean critique.
Nietzsche's genealogical interpretation of human nature is
rhetorical rather than demonstrative; he argues about matters that
lend themselves only to probabilities rather than definitive
resolution. Nietzsche cannot compel the religious fundamentalist
to accept his perspectivist ontology, but this is not worrisome to
Nietzsche since he is arguing that things couldn't be otherwise.77
His goal is to persuade rather than to dictate, and persuasion is a
function of what traditionally would be designated as mere style.
By cajoling his readers to take his destabilizing critiques seriously,
Nietzsche invites them to risk loosening their metaphysical
prejudices. If another philosopher pulls with equal vigor in a
different direction, so much the better, for it is in the weighing and
consideration of different perspectives that one can genuinely
experience the perspectivity of nature.
Modern thinking discounts the cogency of rhetorical
persuasion, but Nietzsche's perspectival ontology and
epistemology lead him to embrace the "dangerous maybe" of
rhetorical argumentation." A religious fundamentalist and
Nietzsche offer competing interpretations and critiques, but
Nietzsche's perspectivist account does not force him to concede
that these critiques are equally legitimate. In rhetorical
77 As Nietzsche aptly puts the point, we "cannot look around our own corner: it is a
hopeless curiosity that [seeks to rise above one's perspective to clearly see perspectivity
itself]. But I should think that today we are at least far from the ridiculous immodesty that
would be involved in decreeing from our corner that perspectives are permitted only from
this corner." NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE, supra note 33, Book V para. 374, at 336.
78 NIETZSCHE, On the Prejudices, supra note 46, para. 2, at 10. Nietzsche criticizes the
absolutism of Platonic metaphysics for refusing to accept a naturalistic explanation of
truth as arising out of, and intertwined with, deception. Id. He heralds the new
philosophers who are willing to ask whether the value of truth is "insidiously related, tied
to, and involved with these wicked, seemingly opposite things-maybe even one with them
in essence. Maybe!" Id. This "dangerous maybe" represents a willingness to break from
bivalent thinking, to move beyond good and evil, and to embrace the realm of rhetorical
engagement that deals only with probabilities. See DOUGLAS THOMAS, READING
NIETZSCHE RHETORICALLY 72-77 (1999).
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engagement, competing interpretations are weighed in a manner
that can yield a provisional conclusion that one is a better
interpretation. Nietzsche's works represent an extended rhetorical
appeal that claims to be a better interpretation, all the while
admitting that there can be no final demonstration of truth by an
appeal to correspondence with the "world-in-itself." Nietzsche
does not surrender to epistemological relativism, nor does he seek
comfort in epistemological dogmatism. He contends that
knowledge can emerge from rhetorical engagements, but that
there is no determinant methodology that can compel recognition
of the victorious argument.7 9 This is why Nietzsche repeatedly
bemoans the "herd mentality" that renders so many people deaf to
his message."0 Like any rhetorician, he can be persuasive only
when the audience is prepared to hear his message. In his caustic
indictment of Christianity in The Antichrist, Nietzsche begins by
acknowledging that the "book belongs to the very few. Perhaps
not one of them is even living yet."" In light of his radical
reworking of the philosophical tradition, Nietzsche appears to
accept his fate as a posthumous philosopher.82
Klein's concession that Nietzsche "merely" offers a competing
ontological interpretation must be read in the context of Klein's
emphasis on the rhetorical dimension of Nietzsche's project.
Hales and Welshon demonstrate that Nietzsche can consistently
assert absolute truths, but Klein makes clear that these assertions
are rhetorical, and therefore never absolutely immune against the
79
Nietzsche is not interested in providing a theory of truth, then, because truth
is not something that admits of final determination by a fixed set of criteria.
Truth is the fleeting calm between battles within a war that has no preordained
or final victor. What does interest Nietzsche, however, is ensuring that the
struggle continue and that inquiry not come to an end with the enforced peace of
dogmatism.
Cox, supra note 35, at 61.
e1 Nietzsche's texts are replete with references to the great majority that is unprepared
for his message, many of them rather brutal and condescending. In concluding the Preface
to The Antichrist Nietzsche catalogues the qualities that his readers must display to
understand his work and then asks, "what matter the rest? The rest-that is merely
mankind. One must be above mankind in strength, in loftiness of soul-in contempt."
NIETZSCHE, Preface to The Antichrist, supra note 40. In the course of arguing that it is
necessary to move "beyond good and evil," Nietzsche repeatedly notes the inability of
most people to understand the radical nature of his message. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE,
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL para. 14, at 21 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1966); id. para. 62, at
74-76; id. para. 202, at 115; id. para. 203, at 117; id. para 212, at 137-39.
"I NIETZSCHE, Preface to The Antichrist, supra note 40.
82 But the provocation of his critiques, even if not fully understood by his
contemporaries, serves a preparatory purpose. "Posthumous men-I, for example-are
understood worse than timely ones, but heard better. More precisely: we are never
understood-hence our authority." NIETZSCHE, Maxins and Arrows para. 15, in Twilight
of the Idols, supra note 39, at 468.
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challenges of interlocutors. Klein argues that even Nietzsche's
apparently relativistic challenge to the concept of truth, On Truth
and Lies in the Extra-Moral Sense, must be read in the light of
lecture notes for a course on rhetoric that Nietzsche prepared in
the same year. Nietzsche does not reject truth entirely, but
instead looks to the ancient tradition of rhetoric as a guide for
claiming truth as to matters that admit only of probabilities.
Klein's rhetorical reading buttresses the conclusion reached by
Hales and Welshon about Nietzsche's perspectivist approach to
knowledge, for it is in rhetorical engagement that Nietzsche claims
that his perspectivist ontology is absolutely true. Hales and
Welshon write: "If there is no absolute knowledge in most of the
sense that can reasonably be assigned to that phrase, the
appropriate response is 'so what?' There is still knowledge-
robust, honest, decent, genuine, perspectival knowledge. And, says
Nietzsche, this is all we really need."' ' Perspectival truth is the
product of rhetorical engagement, but it is sufficient as truth even
if it doesn't meet the false hopes of extra-perspectival knowledge.
Nietzsche's rhetorical conception of truth and argumentation
is not systematically described in his writings. The best evidence
of his rhetorical philosophy is to consider his writings as
exemplifying the rhetorical activity to which he refers. As Douglas
Thomas puts it, Nietzsche "rethinks philosophy through rhetoric."85
Commentators have made much of Nietzsche's unconventional
style of writing, sometimes suggesting that his works are more
literary than philosophical. But this misses the rhetorical depth of
Nietzsche's philosophy: "Nietzsche's understanding of
interpretation, which is fundamentally set against Platonism, can
and should be read as a rhetorical system of thought which,
ultimately, effects a return to style as a constitutive element of
representation itself." 6  Style is not merely ornamentation, but
instead is an expression of the creative power of rhetoric to
overcome the linguistic conceptualism and objectification that
83 KLEIN, supra note 36, at 66. See Carole Blair, Nietzsche's Lecture Notes on Rhetoric:
A Translation, 16 PHIL. & RHETORIC 94-129 (1983).
84 HALES & WELSHON, supra note 37, at 124.
85 THOMAS, supra note 78, at 15.
86 Id. at 2. 1 would want to add that "Platonism" should be regarded as the received
approach, or even Plato's self-understanding, rather than Plato's philosophical activity,
which Gadamer has pointed out is rhetorical and dialogic in form. See HANS-GEORG
GADAMER ON EDUCATION, POETRY AND HISTORY: APPLIED HERMENEUTICS 71
(Dieter Misgeld & Graeme Nicholson eds., Lawrence Schmidt & Monica Reuss trans.,
1992) ("It is more important to find the words which convince the other than those which
can be demonstrated in their truth, once and for all. We can learn this from the Platonic
dialogues."). See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, DIALOGUE AND DIALECTIC:
EIGHT HERMENEUTICAL STUDIES ON PLATO (P. Christopher Smith trans., 1980).
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results from the imperatives of successful communication.
Nietzsche praises art for precisely this reason: the artist embodies
the rhetorical style that breaks free from tendencies toward
absolutism.87 Art makes post-theological life bearable because-in
addition to serving as a critique of the pretensions of metaphysics,
religion, and science-art provides a model of the affirmation of
life, a model of the gay science. 8   Art locates the experience of
truth within illusion, and this affirmation of truth captures our
nature better than the metaphysical claims of the theologians.89
Nietzsche's artist undertakes philosophical questions by
embracing rhetorical engagement rather than demonstrative
argumentation. Genealogical inquiry is a rhetorical practice
because it is an active re-visioning of the significance of the past
and the potential for the future rather than an uncovering of
timeless verities.
Genealogy's vision is continually directed in three directions at
once, always looking toward past, future, and present in a
continuing effort to see how each of the three disrupts the
others.
It is this continual redirection of forces that constitutes
genealogy as critique. It is also a moment of critique that is
continually suspended in the field of possibility. In this sense,'it
is artistic as well, never speaking to the "it was" but only to the
"it will have been." The past, for genealogy, always returns
from the future retroactively. It is this return, for Nietzsche,
87 Id. at 30; see generally id. at 126-54. Science is theology by other means, but
aesthetics celebrates discovery and creation as a unified practice and invites an endless
process of innovation that is cumulative without being teleological. Id. at 65-66.
88
Our ultimate gratitude to art.-If we had not welcomed the arts and invented
this kind of cult of the untrue, then the realization of general untruth and
mendaciousness that now comes to us through science-the realization that
delusion and error are conditions of human knowledge and sensation-would be
utterly unbearable. Honesty would lead to nausea and suicide. But now there is
a counterforce against our honesty that helps us to avoid such consequences: art
as the good will to appearance. We do not always keep our eyes from rounding
off something and, as it were, finishing the poem; and then it is no longer eternal
imperfection that we carry across the river of becoming-then we have the sense
of carrying a goddess, and feel proud and childlike as we perform this service.
As an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable for us, and art furnishes
us with eyes and hands and above all the good conscience to be able to turn
ourselves into such a phenomenon.... We should be able also to stand above
morality .... but also to float above it and play. How then could we possibly
dispense with art-and with the fool?-And as long as you are in any way
ashamed before yourselves, you do not yet belong with us.
NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE, supra note 33, Book 11 para. 107, at 163-64. See also id.,
Book IV para. 299, at 240 ("[W]e want to be the poets of our life-first of all in the
smallest, most everyday matters.").
89 THOMAS, supra note 78, at 106-07.
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that always effects a stylistic moment. Genealogy is never
dispassionate or removed: it is always a mode of "expression,
intention, and the art of surprise."9
Rhetoric is a creative refashioning of accepted topoi to address
contemporary questions. It involves a re-visioning, or dynamis,
rather than just the skillful application of a methodology to fixed
data, as techne.91 Nietzsche's genealogy revives the Protagorean
formulation, in which man is the measure of all things, and
emphasizes man's active and creative role in building a nomos.92
At the individual level, Nietzsche characterizes this creative
activity as giving style to one's character by working within topoi
and constraints that only appear to be limiting.93
By embracing the re-visioning power of rhetoric, Nietzsche
risks the danger of an untrammeled subjectivism that dissolves into
nihilism: "Rhetoric, now capable of making the law, rather than
merely representing it, produces, in effect, a new way of seeing, a
new epistemology that threatens to undermine nature and reason
themselves."94  But Nietzsche appeals to the "intellectual
conscience" that rises above sophistic relativism. Our ontological
fate is to be "relentlessly antidogmatic, antireductionist,
antifoundationalist, and ever in search of new interpretations," but
Nietzsche emphasizes that "such inquiry results in 'truths' that,
though never absolute or ultimate, deliver all that we actually need
from truth and, in any case, all we can ever have of it."9
Translated to a genealogical critique of society, Nietzsche's
rhetorical inquiry involves the active adoption of different
perspectives and the disruption of received wisdom in order to
break free of metaphysical calcifications. Intellectual conscience
demands an honest appreciation of the "relationships among
perspectives, namely the constant weighing and measuring of
interpretations against one another," which in turn serves a
number of critical purposes:
First, it demonstrates the partiality of any one interpretation or
perspective.... Second, this procedure calls attention to the
rules of formation of interpretations and the different sets of
these that govern different interpretations, thus highlighting the
decisions in favor of one or more of the many criteria that
compete for satisfaction in the composition of any
9I Id. at 114 (quoting FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic, in
ECCE HOMO (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1967)).
9' Id. at 99.
92 Id. at 54 ("Protagoras's claim amounts to a claim of jurisdiction: the law is now
spoken by us, not represented through us.").
93 NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE, supra note 33, Book IV para. 290, at 232.
94 THOMAS, supra note 78, at 55.
95 COX, supra note 35, at 53.
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interpretation. Thus, entrenchment is weighed against
innovation; habit against novelty; simplicity, coherence, utility,
and explanatory power against comprehensiveness and precise
description, and so on. Third-and highly important for
Nietzsche-a consideration of the dominant interpretations of
an individual or group produces a whole symptomatology and
genealogy of the dispositions and values that motivate these
choices .... Last, such recognition of the plurality of
interpretations and their irreducibility to a single base reveals
what Nietzsche calls "the whole marvelous uncertainty and
interpretive multiplicity of existence" and thus affirms the
world of becoming, change, and semblance.96
The promise of intellectual conscience leads Nietzsche to accept
the rhetorical construction of the social world with a joyous
affirmation.
Nietzschean critique is a rhetorically-structured genealogical
inquiry. Because critique is a creative recovery-a re-visioning-
of the past, Nietzsche rejects a model of critique that is all-
encompassing or that operates on social structures from the
"outside." Rhetoric always connects the critique of pre-given
absolutes to the creative affirmation of a (sometimes radically)
new formulation of traditional understandings. His genealogical
method is highly critical in that it dissembles cultural ossifications,
but there is simply nowhere to stand outside of the cultural
resources to construct new cultural understandings ex nihilo.
Consequently, there is
a kind of double movement in Nietzsche. Generally there is
both a yes-saying part and a no-saying part; that is, Nietzsche is
almost never purely critical....
Even Christianity, which Nietzsche blasts again and again with
all the powers at his command, he concedes is not utterly
without merit.... Nietzsche destroys previous philosophical
structures, only to take their components and re-use them in an
original way.97
96 Id. at 55-56 (quoting The Gay Science para. 2).
97 HALES & WELSHON, supra note 37, at 8-9. This doesn't suggest that Nietzsche's
critiques are superficial, but instead uncovers the extent of his radical remaking of the
tradition. In his diatribe against Christianity, Nietzsche makes clear that he doesn't seek
to obliterate Christianity but instead to recover its significance and subsequent decadence:
"I go back, I tell the genuine history of Christianity." NIETZSCHE, The Antichrist, supra
note 40, para. 39, at 612. Nietzsche's radical remaking of tradition is perhaps most evident
in the development of his perspectivist ontology:
Now, having ripped apart the edifice of metaphysics, he pokes among the
ruins to see what, if anything, can be salvaged. Yet, unlike Descartes, who also
though he had demolished a house of belief only to construct a new one
suspiciously similar to the old, Nietzsche does something more radical: from the
scraps of the absolutist metaphysical tradition, he begins to piece together an
ontology that is explicitly and thoroughly perspectivist.
20031
HeinOnline -- 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 997 2002-2003
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
This is the rhetorician's wisdom and skill: refashioning the bonds
of social cohesion in new ways to meet the demands of the present.
Nietzsche makes clear that an unceasing and uncompromising
critique would undermine the gay science that he heralds.98
Critique is always a destructive construction, just as a rhetorical
refashioning of accepted premises undermines the absolutism of
these premises.
Nietzschean critique is a rhetorical activity that acknowledges
its rhetoricity. Nietzsche challenges the cultural understandings of
his day through genealogical criticism that simultaneously loosens
the encrustation of habitual thinking and refashions a dramatically
new understanding of cultural traditions. He employs a
naturalistic critique because he appeals to the emerging
interpretations that define social reality, even if they remain
repressed and are denied. His famous announcement of the death
of God is not a suggestion for change made by an all-knowing
critic; rather, it is a commentary on what already has occurred, a
rhetorical assessment of shifts that are underway but remain
unacknowledged. Nietzsche's critical activity is consistent with his
perspectivist ontology, because rather than proposing an eternally
valid description of the human condition he offers an
interpretation of a shared reality that is subject to criticism and
refinement. Nietzsche confronts the human condition with joy and
openness rather than hiding behind the fables that no longer ring
true (Christianity) or the new fables that similarly obscure the
human condition (positivist natural science).
HALES & WELSHON, supra note 37, at 62. See NIETZSCHE, What is Noble, supra note 42,
para. 280, at 224:
"Too bad! What? Isn't he going-back?"
Yes, but you understand him badly when you complain. He is going back like
anybody who wants to attempt a big jump.-
Id.
98 NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE, supra note 33, Book 11 para. 76, at 130. Nietzsche
claims to "love brief habits" that yield much knowledge, but to "hate" the "tyrant" of
enduring habits. And yet, he makes clear that an unceasing critique of all habits, the effort
to extricate oneself from a rhetorically-secured social context altogether, would be
unbearable.
Most intolerable, to be sure, and the terrible par excellence would be for me a
life entirely devoid of habits, a life that would demand perpetual improvisation.
That would be my exile and my Siberia.
Id. Book IV para. 295, at 237.
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III. THE HERMENEUTICAL CHARACTER OF NIETZSCHEAN
CRITIQUE AND THE CRITICAL DIMENSION OF PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS
Rather than a centripetal activity issuing from the subject-
centered rationality of an isolated epistemological, moral, or
aesthetic subject, we understand critique as a centrifugal
deployment of discursive and nondiscursive social practices....
Critique, refigured as praxial critique, enjoys neither modernity's
zeal for foundations nor its hopes for the attainment of certainty.
It rests content to discern and assess the play of forms of thought
and action against the background of changing and historically
conditioned patterns of signification.
-Calvin 0. Schrag99
My model of Nietzschean critique captures Nietzsche's
vibrant critical spirit without surrendering the rhetorical rationality
at work in his writings. Having rescued Nietzsche from the polar
excesses of his postmodern readers and his neo-Kantian analytic
readers, my model of Nietzschean critique offers a provocation for
rethinking the possibility of critical theory within Gadamer's
philosophical hermeneutics. Nietzsche's radical-often shrill-
irreverence admittedly stands in sharp contrast to Gadamer's
veneration of the resources of tradition that continually are
remade in hermeneutical exchanges. The prejudiced reception of
each philosopher-construing Gadamer as a conservative
traditionalist and Nietzsche as a postmodern nihilist-has
precluded an investigation into the potential connections between
their work. Nevertheless, Nietzschean critique shares substantial
features with Gadamerian hermeneutics. I do not intend to unify
their philosophies with flattening and facile readings of their work,
or to subjugate Nietzsche to Gadamer. Instead, my goal is to draw
connections that permit each philosopher to engage the other.
Working from my model of Nietzschean critique, there is ample
room for a productive and edifying dialogue.
There is no real precedent for reading Nietzsche and
Gadamer together.1" Although Gadamer writes extensively about
99 CALVIN 0. SCHRAG, THE RESOURCES OF RATIONALITY: A RESPONSE TO THE
POSTMODERN CHALLENGE 57 (1992).
100 I have only found one example in the commentary written in English. In a recent
article Craig Allen Beam suggests that "if hermeneutics is ever to put to rest the
accusation that it is too conservative and not sufficiently critical, Nietzsche is helpful both
as an ally and a supplement to Gadamer," while also noting that as yet there has been no
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the philosophical tradition generally, and the important resources
within German philosophy particularly, he is surprisingly silent
about the relevance of Nietzsche's philosophy to his work.'0'
effort to draw these connections. Craig Allen Beam, Gadamer and Macintyre: Tradition
as a Resource of Rationality, 25 KINESIS 15, 28, 31 n.14 (1998). I offer this article as a
detailed elaboration of how these connections might be drawn, consistent with Beam's
very brief overview.
Il One possible interpretation of Gadamer's silence is to suppose that he considered
Nietzsche to be more of a literary figure than a philosopher. In an essay devoted to
Nietzsche's work, Gadamer offers a reading of Zarathustra that might appear to suggest
that Gadamer believes Nietzsche to be more a "stylist" and a "poet" than a true
philosopher. See generally Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Drama of Zarathustra, in
NIETZSCHE'S NEW SEAS: EXPLORATIONS IN PHILOSOPHY, AESTHETICS AND POLITICS
220 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Tracy B. Strong eds., Thomas Heilke trans., 1988).
However, Gadamer acknowledges that Zarathustra's dialogues are not merely cover for
didactic monologues, nor are they purely aesthetic. Gadamer takes Zarathustra's semi-
poetic dialogues seriously because they resolutely resist being absorbed into Nietzsche's
mature doctrines, doctrines that Heidegger famously characterized as representing the
culmination of metaphysical thinking. In Zarathustra's dialogues, Gadamer discovers, the
voice of the philosopher speaks without reaffirming the grip of western metaphysics:
In the end, the inheritance of metaphysics is preserved in Nietzsche's radical
critique of consciousness and self-consciousness from the perspective of life, and
in his sketch of a universal theory of the will to power, and this metaphysics, as
Heidegger has correctly seen, terminates in the mastery of all being, in the rule
of technology. In contrast, the drama of Zarathustra imparts another teaching.
The teacher and cultivator, the revaluator of all values, who wants to be
Zarathustra, must in the end say to his soul, "Sing, speak no more!"
What does this aim at? Certainly to show that no doctrine that sees the will to
power at work in everything and that tears the mask from truth, one after the
other, can ever reach an end ....
Id. at 230-31. In short, Gadamer finds in Nietzsche's dialogues, much as he finds in Plato's
dialogues, confirmation of his hermeneutical-rhetorical orientation.
This short essay aside, Gadamer's only sustained attention (in translation) to
Nietzsche's philosophical importance occurred during his famous "non-conversation" with
Jacques Derrida at the Goethe Institute in Paris during 1981. Gadamer prepared a
lengthy paper for the meeting, tracing the divergence of French deconstruction and
German hermeneutics to competing interpretations of Heidegger, and he characterized
the deconstructive reading of Heidegger as one that incorrectly championed radical
readings of Nietzsche's thought. Gadamer observes that Derrida and his followers "have
not grasped the significance of the seductive in Nietzsche's thought," which leads them to
embrace the same extreme "self-dissolution" of metaphysics. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Text
and Interpretation, in DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION: THE GADAMER-DERRIDA
ENCOUNTER 25 (Diane P. Michelfelder & Richard E. Palmer eds., Dennis J. Schmidt &
Richard Palmer trans., 1989) (1984). In response to Derrida's cryptic and largely non-
responsive reply to his paper, Gadamer expresses his frustration by comparing Derrida's
style to Nietzsche's style.
Is [Derrida] really disappointed that we cannot understand each other? Indeed
not, for in his view this would be a relapse into metaphysics. He will, in fact, be
pleased, because he takes this private experience of disillusionment to confirm
his own metaphysics. But I cannot see here how he can be right only with
respect to himself, be in agreement only with himself. Of course I understand
very well why he invokes Nietzsche here. It is precisely because both of them
are mistaken about themselves. Actually both speak and write in order to be
understood.
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Reply to Jacques Derrida, in DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION:
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THE GADAMER-DERRIDA ENCOUNTER 55, 56-57 (Diane P. Michelfelder & Richard E.
Palmer eds., Dennis J. Schmidt & Richard Palmer trans., 1989) (1984). Gadamer's
rejection of Nietzsche would appear to be unequivocal, but in the course of his formal
paper he acknowledges Nietzsche's role in subverting positivism and logocentrism, and
appears to demonstrate a more balanced appreciation of Nietzsche's importance. This
would accord with Gadamer's essay on Zarathustra's dialogic significance. It is likely,
then, that it is the reading of Nietzsche by Derrida and the French deconstructionists that
provides Gadamer's foil, rather than Nietzsche himself. Later, in a letter to Fred
Dallmayr regarding his encounter with Derrida, Gadamer acknowledged that it is
precisely the "fundamentally different ways" in which Nietzsche can be read that divided
him from Derrida; he also aligned himself with Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche as the
"self-disintegration of metaphysics" that leads to a search for a "bridge into a new
language, into another thinking (which perhaps does not even exist)." Hans-Georg
Gadamer, Letter to Dallmayr, in DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION: THE GADAMER-
DERRIDA ENCOUNTER 93, 93-94 (Diane P. Michelfelder & Richard E. Palmer eds.,
Dennis J. Schmidt & Richard Palmer trans., 1989). As suggested in the quote above,
Gadamer appears to believe only that Nietzsche's commentators, and perhaps Nietzsche
himself, have misinterpreted Nietzsche's philosophical initiatives, which is different from
rejecting those initiatives. Given the context of this meeting with Derrida, I do not regard
Gadamer's comments as precluding my reading of his philosophy in concert with
Nietzsche's philosophy.
Still, it remains curious (to say the least) that Gadamer did not engage Nietzsche's
thought during his long career, and recent autobiographical information suggests that
Gadamer expressly chose to avoid such an encounter because he believed that it would
not be a productive avenue for his thought. Gadamer regards himself as a student of
Heidegger, but he does not follow Heidegger's thought as much as he challenges
Heidegger's thought from within. It may very well be that a principal point of distinction
between his work and Heidegger's is Gadamer's belief that Heidegger's confrontation
with Nietzsche was ill-fated.
Gadamer suggests.., that Heidegger in part, [with respect to his interpretation
of the pre-Socratics] as elsewhere, was misled by his reliance on Nietzsche.
In a recent interview, Gadamer reports that shortly before his death Heidegger
told his family that Nietzsche had ruined him. Whereas Heidegger had largely
oriented his hermeneutical effort around a confrontation with Nietzsche,
Gadamer acknowledges that his hermeneutical orientation, whose impulse came
in the first place from Heidegger, is a critical response to Dilthey.
• . . Unlike Heidegger... Gadamer does not paint a dark and apocalyptic
picture of our age. He finds Heidegger's dismal view as overdramatized,
dangerous, and hubristic. Gadamer writes, for example: "Don't we all run the
risk of a terrible intellectual hubris if we equate Nietzsche's anticipations and the
ideological confusion of the present with life as it is actually lived with its own
forms of solidarity? Here, in fact, my divergence from Heidegger is
fundamental."
Robert J. Dostal, Gadamer's Relation to Heidegger and Phenomenology, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO GADAMER 260-62 (Robert J. Dostal ed., 2002) (quoting
Hans-Georg Gadamer, A Letter by Professor Hans-Georg Gadamer, in RICHARD
BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM 261, 264 (1983)). Again, I believe
that Gadamer's motivations and assumptions for avoiding Nietzsche (shaped,
undoubtedly, by Heidegger's disastrous and embarrassing relationship with the Nazi Party
during the war as much as purely scholarly reasons) do not undermine my claim that a
Gadamerian reading of Nietzsche could have overcome the errors in Heidegger's
approach that Gadamer diagnosed.
Even if the evidence led me to conclude that Gadamer rejected the claim that there
could be any profitable connections between his work and Nietzsche's philosophy, I would
regard his position as mistaken and argue that this article demonstrates that Gadamer was
10012003]
HeinOnline -- 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1001 2002-2003
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
However, in a revealing passage in his intellectual autobiography,
Gadamer suggests that one of the driving forces behind his work
was the desire to find a means of engaging in philosophical
thinking in the wake of Nietzsche's undeniable legacy.112 Gadamer
generally has succeeded, in my judgment, but his work can benefit
tremendously from a more explicit and direct engagement with
Nietzschean critique.
Without claiming to be exhaustive, I will discuss three
important points of convergence between philosophical
hermeneutics and Nietzschean critique. First, Nietzsche's
perspectivist epistemology bears important similarities to
Gadamer's contention that understanding involves a fusion of
horizons. Additionally, both philosophers place importance on the
rhetorical tradition and the possibility of rhetorical knowledge.
Finally, in what may be a surprising and little noticed way,
Nietzsche's unremitting challenge to traditional understandings
exemplifies Gadamer's emphasis on the importance of tradition to
understanding. Using these three topics as a focus, my goal is to
position Nietzschean critique and Gadamerian philosophical
hermeneutics as provocative and challenging supplements to each
other. I can't think of a more appropriate way to celebrate the
perspectival character of knowledge and the inevitability of the
fusion of horizons than this effort to read Nietzsche and Gadamer
together.
A. Perspectivism and Fusion of Horizons
Nietzschean critique is grounded in an ontology, but it is a
thoroughly perspectivist ontology. Ontological perspectivism
promotes openness to multiple perspectives as a response to the
perspectival character of truth, and not simply as a methodology
wrong about his own philosophical initiatives. However, I do not believe that th2 evidence
requires me to make such a presumptuous claim.
112 Gadamer writes that in his formative years he found in Martin Heidegger "a thinker
whose philosophical power was adequate to the powerful initiatives put forward by
Nietzsche ... [answering] the gigantic form of Friedrich Nietzsche with his ecstatic critique
of everything, including the illusions of self-consciousness." Hans-Georg Gadamer,
Reflections on My Philosophical Journey, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HANS-GEORG
GADAMER 3, 6-7 (Lewis Edwin Hahn ed., Richard E. Palmer trans., 1997). In his further
reflections on his ill-fated encounter with Derrida in 1981, see supra note 101, Gadamer
suggests that the very challenge of his hermeneutics is "to take up Nietzsche in a
thoughtful way," which would mean to recognize that someone who takes "deconstruction
to heart and insists on difference stands at the beginning of a conversation, not at its end."
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Destruktion and Deconstruction, in DIALOGUE AND
DECONSTRUCTION: THE GADAMER-DERRIDA ENCOUNTER 102, 113 (Diane P.
Michelfelder & Richard E. Palmer eds., Geoff Waite & Richard Palmer trans., 1989)
(1985).
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for gaining better access to bedrock, unitary truth. Nietzsche's
ontological perspectivism immediately lends itself to comparisons
to Gadamer's famous claim that a "fusion of horizons" marks
every interpretive event."3 Just as Nietzsche argues that the
perspectival nature of reality requires us to embrace many
different perspectives in pursuit of truth, Gadamer argues that the
hermeneutical nature of reality requires a fusion of horizons if we
are to understand a traditionary text. Gadamer's ontological
account of human understanding therefore shares the same
curious structure as Nietzsche's ontological account: both
philosophers deny that there can be perspective-independent
truths that remain insulated from the activity of knowing.
Despite this initial similarity, there clearly are important
differences between the two concepts. Nietzsche's perspectivism
leads him to be wary of his interlocutors. If other thinkers can
only have a partial perspective, then it follows that the critic must
constantly be on guard against being co-opted by the limited views
of those with whom he interacts. Wariness is particularly
appropriate in light of Nietzsche's constant emphasis that only a
few bold thinkers have been able to overcome the suffocating
perspective of "herd mentality" by moving beyond the patently
absurd religious and metaphysical myths that defined European
culture in his day. Nietzsche concedes that the critic is no less
bound by his perspective, but he contends that the critic can
broaden his perspective by opening himself to will to power, the
unconscious play of perspectival forces that lies behind the
conscious myth-making of most philosophizing.
In contrast, Gadamer places great emphasis on learning from
others by engaging them in a hermeneutical event of
understanding in which one accepts the potential superiority of the
other's perspective. Understanding is not a question of
determining whose perspective is superior, Gadamer argues, but
rather in discovering that each person's previous understandings
are limited, and that new understanding results from moving
beyond the two prejudiced perspectives by fashioning a new (yet
still perspectival) understanding. Gadamer enjoins critical
theorists to abandon their wariness and sense of superiority, and
he emphatically rejects monological models of critique. Critical
insight is gained by engaging others in an educative experience of
understanding.
If Nietzsche is too wary of the necessarily limited perspectives
1113 This connection is briefly suggested by Beam: "Thus, far from being a postmodern
nihilist, Nietzsche challenges us to broaden and enrich our point of view through
something like the hermeneutic fusion of horizons." Beam, supra note 100, at 27.
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of his interlocutors, Gadamer is too wary of his own limited
perspective in deferring to his dialogue partners. Although this is
not merely a difference in accents or a conflict among subsidiary
themes, it would be a mistake to conclude that Nietzsche and
Gadamer are fundamentally incompatible. The initially plausible
connection between perspectivism and the fusion of horizons must
be tempered by a realistic account of their different approaches,
but I believe that acknowledging these differences leads to a better
understanding of the issues that both thinkers raise.
Nietzsche clearly is ambivalent about the prospects for a
productive fusion of horizons with a dialogue partner. On one
hand, Nietzsche agrees that a critic must continually move beyond
his own limited perspective. Against the moralists obsessed with
self-control and self-sufficiency, he argues that one "must be able
to lose one-self occasionally if one wants to learn something from
things different from oneself."'" Nietzsche argues that this process
of renewal is not subject to rational and methodological direction,
but rather is a product of critically engaging previously held
truths."5 He notes that it is a matter of good luck if one is fated to
have believed for a time in the cause of one's contemporary
opponents, since it is this direct experience of perspectivity that
can liberate the critic from narrow-mindedness.''6 On the other
hand, Nietzsche remains skeptical that his contemporaries can
offer him much insight from their limited perspectives. Nietzsche
mocks the false humility of accepting criticisms of one's own
limitations, contending that the critic's counterattacks on hallowed
cultural truths are a much more significant event.' °7 Nietzsche's
critic is a wanderer who escapes the confining morality of his own
culture in order to gain perspective on its perspectivity. °8 This
theme comes through most starkly in Nietzsche's frequent
references, particularly in Beyond Good and Evil, to the herd
mentality that the critic must strive to avoid in the exercise of
intellectual conscience.
The wariness of others' limitations is perhaps best captured in
Nietzsche's counsel to avoid engaging others with the goal of
changing them, and instead to pursue the higher goal of
generalized cultural critique.
New caution.-Let us stop thinking so much about
104 NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE, supra note 33, Book IV para. 305, at 245.
"'5 Id. Book IV para. 307, at 245.
106 Id. Book IV para. 323, at 255 ("Good luck in fate. -The greatest distinction that
fate can bestow on us is to let us fight for a time on the side of our opponents. With that
we are predestined for a great victory.").
"17 Id. Book IV para. 297, at 239.
108 Id. Book V para. 380, at 342.
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punishing, reproaching, and improving others! We rarely
change an individual, and if we should succeed for once,
something may also have been accomplished, unnoticed: we
may have been changed by him. Let us rather see to it that our
own influence on all that is yet to come balances and outweighs
his influence. Let us not contend in a direct fight-and that is
what all reproaching, punishing, and attempts to improve others
amount to. Let us rather raise ourselves that much higher. Let
us color our own example ever more brilliantly. Let our
brilliance make them look dark. No, let us not become darker
ourselves on their account, like all those who punish others and
feel dissatisfied. Let us sooner step aside. Let us look away. 9
At first glance, Nietzsche appears to be discounting the possibility
of productive exchanges with others by noting the threat of being
co-opted by the herd mentality. But this passage is better
understood as a plea for critics to stop engaging others from a
position of presumed superiority, since this posture only reinforces
the limited perspective of the critic and thus reinscribes the
prevailing morality. Nietzsche continually emphasizes the positive
nature of critique, which is the hallmark of his gay science. " ' He
desperately wants to move beyond a moralistic reproach that is
grounded in a fixed and unyielding perspective by foregoing the
urge to chastise others; instead, he wants to critique morality itself.
It is not the fruitlessness of the fusion of horizons that worries
Nietzsche, then, but rather the inevitable tendency to be drawn
into the temptation to subjugate others to our own horizons,
thereby reinforcing rather than challenging one's perspective from
within a prevailing morality.
Nietzsche remains silent about how the critic is supposed to
rise above his cultural limitations to become a wanderer. There is
ample evidence in his texts and in his own life that Nietzsche may
have regarded this task as a monological endeavor that avoids the
inevitable pitfalls of engaged dialogue within prevailing social
strictures. But it should be apparent that this position would
undercut much of Nietzsche's radicalism, and would contradict the
undeniably rhetorical character of his writings. Even if Nietzsche
viewed himself as being competent to proceed monologically,
Nietzschean critique is best realized by rejecting monologism. I
contend that Gadamer's concept of the fusion of horizons provides
the best account of how the Nietzschean critic can move beyond
his own prejudiced perspective, rejecting the presumptuous
sovereignty of univocal criticism while also eschewing a crude
10 Id. Book IV para. 321, at 254.
1o Id. Book IV para. 276, at 223; id. para. 304, at 244.
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moralistic critique of the other that reaffirms prevailing structures
of thought. Gadamer's corrective, though, must also be re-
assessed in light of Nietzsche's insights.
Gadamer uses the concept of the fusion of horizons in Truth
and Method to describe the historicality of the experience of
understanding. He emphasizes that there are no distinct horizons
to be fused, since the horizon of the present always imports within
it the horizon of the past. Gadamer discusses a "fusion" only to
highlight the dynamic tension between present understanding and
the past, leading to his conclusion that "understanding is always the
fusion of these horizons supposedly existing by themselves.""...
Crude historicism posits the past as something that is inert and
accessible to us as an object, but the activity of positing the past
always is an application of the past to the present in the form of an
interpretation, and so this activity reveals the living power of the
supposedly closed horizon of the past."2 The interpenetration of
past and present means that the reverse also holds true: the past
horizon is always re-created in the course of being posited by the
present horizon."3  Applied to textual interpretation, Gadamer
argues that the fusion of horizons means that a traditionary text
can have no meaning in itself, because it has meaning only in
relation to the questioning that it provokes in a situated reader."4
In short, Gadamer's principal theme is that understanding is
historically conditioned.
Gadamer extends his discussion of fusion of horizons to the
experience of dialogue with another, and certainly he would
endorse a respectful and charitable engagement with another
person rather than a dismissive refusal to accept the potential
superiority of the other's understanding. But this ethical and
pragmatic implication of his philosophy should not be mistaken for
his philosophical point. At any given moment there are numerous
individuals who are unlikely to bring something productive to a
conversation with the critic because they are wholly given over to
reigning ideologies. However, understanding is always a product
of a dialogue that operates as an application of the past to the
present, even if a particular individual does not facilitate this
process. Gadamer writes about the provocations that we find in
the supposedly closed horizon in the past, but in a revealing
111 GADAMER, supra note 1, at 306.
112 [I. at 307.
'3 Id. at 374.
14 Id. at 397 ("The historical life of a tradition depends on being constantly assimilated
and interpreted. An interpretation that was correct in itself would be a foolish ideal that
mistook the nature of tradition. Every interpretation has to adapt itself to the
hermeneutical situation to which it belongs.").
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footnote added to the fifth German edition of Truth and Method,
Gadamer suggests that it is not only temporal distance that opens
the space for critique. Elsewhere I have argued that Gadamer's
later attention to multiculturalism provides one example of
"dialogic distance" that is not temporal in nature. 15 His doctrine
of fusion of horizons is not a claim that we must accept everyone's
opinion to some degree, but rather is that other horizons-
whether provided by the past, distinct cultures, or other distanced
perspectives-can provoke us to overcome our own limitations.
Nietzsche bemoans the limitations of German culture for this very
reason: his contemporaries were locked in a horizon that stultified
thinking rather than provoking new understandings.
It is now clear that the difference between Nietzsche's
perspectivism and Gadamer's fusion of horizons is that Nietzsche
is primarily concerned with the stultifying effects of horizontal
relationships within a cultural horizon, whereas Gadamer is
primarily concerned with promoting the educative effects of
vertical relationships through time. The similarity between their
accounts is explained by the fact that these two features are closely
related, whereas the differences in their accounts are best
explained by the important distinctions between these two
experiences. Nietzsche's perspectivism naturally leads him to
mistrust the contemporary understanding of the "herd animals,"
which often pose as universal and eternal truths. But it is
Gadamer's concept of the fusion of horizons that is most effective
in destabilizing these false claims and re-situating understanding in
an ongoing dynamic application of the past to present
circumstances. Nietzsche's perspectivism cautions us against
looking for quick answers from our cultural contemporaries,
whereas Gadamer's analysis of fusion of horizons encourages us to
exploit the continuing and creative application of previous
understandings in a new setting as the manner in which
parochialism is exposed and (incompletely) overcome. Read
together, Nietzsche and Gadamer reveal that it is foolish and
counterproductive for a cultural critic to claim to have all the
answers and to disparage the prejudiced perspectives of his
contemporaries, but also that it is equally foolish for the critic to
disable his critical agency in the face of his own prejudiced
forestructure of understanding as a participant within a cultural
115 See Francis J. Mootz III, Legal Classics: After Deconstructing the Legal Canon, 72
N.C. L. REV. 977, 1023 (1994). Fred Dallmayr has elaborated this Gadamerian theme in
his recent books, with his customary grace and erudition. See FRED R. DALLMAYR,
ALTERNATIVE VISIONS (1998); FRED DALLMAYR, BEYOND ORIENTALISM: ESSAYS ON
CROSS-CULTURAL ENCOUNTER (1996).
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perspective.
B. Philosophy and the Rhetorical Tradition
Analyzing the connections between perspectivism and fusion
of horizons only introduces the extent to which Nietzsche and
Gadamer can profitably be read together. This initial point of
convergence is enriched by comparing how Gadamer and
Nietzsche emphasize the rhetorical nature of critical theory,
because it is in rhetorical engagement that perspectives are
revealed and the dynamic of fusion of horizons occur. Nietzsche
provides more explicit guidance than Gadamer, both in his
thematic development and by the degree to which he exemplifies
the rhetorical character of philosophical thinking. Nevertheless,
Gadamer is not so far removed from Nietzsche in this regard as
one might assume. Closer examination reveals that Nietzschean
critique can be compared profitably with Gadamer's rhetorical
model of understanding, even though Gadamer appears to
acknowledge that rhetoric is only a minor theme of his work.
Nietzsche's philosophical activity is expressly rhetorical in
both theme and format. He embodies the "dangerous maybe" in
his work by challenging prevailing conceptions and prevailing
philosophical conventions. His genealogical inquiry recuperates
the significance of the past with artful interpretations that appeal
only to "intellectual conscience" rather than eternal truths. By
seeking to loosen the grip of encrusted thought, which is to say the
solidification of past rhetorical engagements into dogma,
Nietzsche assumes the role of the ancient rhetoricians in seeking
adherence to claims that are subject to persuasion but not
demonstration. This aspect of Nietzsche's thinking is manifest and
widely acknowledged.
The rhetorical dimension of Gadamer's philosophy is much
less overt. His masterwork, Truth and Method, lumbers through
500 pages of relatively conventional philosophical discourse, in
which he scarcely mentions the rhetorical tradition. Nevertheless,
Gadamer's extended analysis of conversation as the paradigm of
hermeneutical understanding certainly suggests that the rhetorical
tradition is critical to his work, and this is confirmed by his brief
(but prominent) discussion in Truth and Method of the need to
recuperate Vico's development of the concept of sensus communis.
Gadamer aligns Vico with the substantive rhetorical goal of saying
the right thing well, and applauds his development of the "positive
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ambiguity of the rhetorical ideal."' 6  At the end of the book,
Gadamer reminds the reader that a central feature of his argument
has been the recovery and rehabilitation of the rhetorical model of
knowledge, even though this theme has virtually disappeared from
explicit discussion in the ensuing pages.1 7 Picking up on these
explicit, but often overlooked, references, Klaus Dockhorn's
review of Truth and Method argued that Gadamer underestimated
the extent to which the rhetorical tradition underwrites his project,
but he nevertheless predicted that the "widespread depreciation or
dismissal of rhetoric.., should be effectively brought to an end
by" Truth and Method."'
In subsequent essays, Gadamer more clearly indicated that his
hermeneutical philosophy was aligned with rhetorical insights."9
In particular, Gadamer invoked the rhetorical tradition in
response to the charge by Habermas and others that his
hermeneutical philosophy was overly protective of the status quo.
In his 1972 "Afterword" to the third German edition of Truth and
Method, Gadamer responded by characterizing Habermas's
rejection of rhetoric in favor of the ideal speech situation of
rational discourse as "frighteningly unreal.' 2° Gadamer argues
that the ancient rhetorical tradition concerned the art of
persuasion when there are multiple reasonable views that cannot
be rationally resolved:
I would like to see more recognition of the fact that this is
the realm hermeneutics shares with rhetoric: the realm of
arguments that are convincing (which is not the same as
logically compelling). It is the realm of practice and humanity
in general, and its province is not where the power of "iron-clad
conclusions" must be accepted without discussion, nor where
emancipatory reflection is certain of its "contrafactual
agreements," but rather where controversial issues are decided
by reasonable consideration. 2'
Gadamer expressly recognizes the importance of rhetoric to his
hermeneutical philosophy, and in his later essays he agrees that it
is rhetorical exchanges that open the hermeneutical situation to
116 GADAMER, supra note 1, at 20.
117 Id. at 485.
I'll Klaus Dockhorn, Hans-Georg Gadamer's Truth and Method, 13 PHIL. & RHETORIC
160, 160 (1980).
"9 See, e.g., Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful, in THE RELEVANCE
OF THE BEAUTIFUL AND OTHER ESSAYS 17 (Robert Bernasconi ed., Nicholas Walker
trans., 1986) (1977); Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical
Task, in REASON IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE 113-38 (Frederick G. Lawrence trans.. 1981)
(1978); Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Expressive Power of Language, 107 PUBLICATIONS
MOD. LANGUAGE ASS'N AN. 348-52 (1992).
1211 GADAMER, supra note 1, at 568.
121 Id.
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critical insight.122
In addition to these thematic developments in Gadamer's
more recent work, on closer examination it is clear that Gadamer's
philosophical activity exemplifies the rhetorical dimension of his
thought. Truth and Method is a rather ungainly book despite its
justly earned renown, but Gadamer has not defined his
philosophical career with the production of scholarly books.
Instead, the bulk of his "writings" are essays and transcripts of
speeches that he has given throughout his long career. In the
translator's introduction to a recent collection of essays, Chris
Dawson notes that "Gadamer reads like a great rhetorician, which
is what he really is. His rehabilitation of rhetoric is the principal
original element in his philosophy, and he uses rhetoric as much as
he advocates it."' 23  Much like Nietzsche, then, Gadamer is a
cultural critic who writes and speaks in order to persuade his
audience about matters that are not subject to a compelling proof:
If we are looking for specific claims supported by
watertight arguments, then, we shall find Gadamer irritating
and shallow. But if we are looking for ways of approaching
really deep questions about the world and our place in it, or if
we are looking for some kind of orientation in modern society
and are frustrated by the lack of any external viewpoint from
which to examine it, we shall find Gadamer's historical rhetoric
thrilling and invigorating.
122 Gadamer's other extended discussion of rhetoric similarly occurs in the context of
defending his approach from the challenges issued by Habermas. See HANS-GEORG
GADAMER, On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection, in PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS (David E. Linge ed., 1976) (G.B. Hess & R.E. Palmer trans., 1967)
(demonstrating that the scientistic claims of critical sociology fail for the same reason that
scientistic approaches to rhetoric and hermeneutics fail to capture the full scope of the
experiences of persuasion and understanding). It is not happenstance that Gadamer
invokes rhetoric extensively in the latter essay, since he is not only rebutting Habermas's
critical theory but also absorbing and responding to Klaus Dockhorn's review of Truth and
Method. Dockhorn argues that, despite scant references to rhetoric, the entire argument
of Truth and Method is suffused with the concepts of the rhetorical tradition, see
Dockhorn, supra note 118, at 161, and Gadamer readily accepts this characterization as a
helpful clarification of his thesis, see GADAMER, supra, at 43 nn.3, 6 & 7.
In his most recent commentary on his philosophy, Gadamer has chosen to highlight
the rhetorical themes that guided his thinking and therefore bring to the forefront what
earlier was only intimated by his discussion of Vico. See Hans-Georg Gadamer,
Reflections on My Philosophical Journey, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HANS-GEORG
GADAMER 30 (Lewis Edwin Hahn ed., Richard E. Palmer trans., 1997): Hans-Georg
Gadamer, Reply to Donald Phillip Verene, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HANS-GEORG
GADAMER, supra, at 154 (commending Verene's "more precise elaboration" of the
elements of Vico's philosophy that are relevant to Gadamer's project); HANS-GEORG
GADAMER, The Expressive Force of Language: On the Function of Rhetoric in Gaining
Knowledge, in PRAISE OFTHEORY 123-34 (Chris Dawson trans., 1998) (1979) (noting that
rhetoric remains central despite the ascendency of the model of the natural sciences).
'2- Chris Dawson, Translator's Introduction to PRAISE OF THEORY, supra note 122, at
xv-xxxviii, xvi.
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We must not be deceived by Gadamer's chatty style, which ...
conceals a wealth of subtle thinking and artistry. Gadamer
deals with real and serious problems, and goes only as far with
them as he is sure he is justified in doing .... [His approach is
to use] rhetoric to build a communal solidarity in which we can
find balances and compromises that will allow us to make better
sense of ourselves and the world we share.'24
As Gadamer aptly put the point in response to an interviewer's
question about the alleged lack of philosophical precision in his
writings, "It may be a cultivated thing to eat with a knife and fork,
but that is not the right approach in philosophy.' 25  Gadamer
eschews the role of the know-it-all professional philosopher who
can first determine and then pronounce the truth from a removed
distance. Instead, he seeks rhetorical engagement with his readers.
Looking beyond the monumental Truth and Method, then,
Gadamer's philosophy of rhetoric converges with his rhetorical
style to reveal an engaged thinker, teacher and citizen.
A careful consideration of their work shows that Gadamer
and Nietzsche are aligned in their recuperation of classical rhetoric
as an antidote to the lifeless, technocratic consciousness of
modernity. Despite this juncture in their thinking, it remains
necessary, as with my comparison of perspectivism and fusion of
horizons, to resist the temptation to offer a facile reading that
collapses their distinct approaches into a unified account.
Gadamer's attention to rhetorical engagement can profitably be
compared with Nietzsche's rhetorical style, but it is essential to
understand that the two thinkers are not covering the same
ground.
Nietzsche employs rhetoric in the sense that he searches for
appropriate tools of persuasion; he makes claims on an audience
with the goal of persuading them rather than approaching them
with an openness to reaching mutual understanding.' 26 Although
Gadamer's numerous essays and addresses display subtle social
124 Id. at xviii-xix, xxxvii-xxxviii.
125 HANS-GEORG GADAMER ON EDUCATION, POETRY AND HISTORY: APPLIED
HERMENEUTICS 7 (Dieter Misgeld & Graeme Nicholson eds., Lawrence Schmidt &
Monica Reuss trans., 1992).
126 Here, we should recall Aristotle's definition of rhetoric as "an ability in each
[particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion." ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC
36 (George A. Kennedy trans., 1991) (circa 350 A.D.). In other words, rhetoric is the
artistic skill of being able to find the best means of persuading a particular audience,
rather than the result of successfully persuading them or the perception of a truth that is
independent of one's ability to persuade others. Nietzsche works to find the means of
persuasion: given the weaknesses of his audience he does not make successful persuasion
his primary concern, but neither does he retreat into solipsism.
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critique, his philosophical focus is an investigation of the
hermeneutical dimension that subtends such partisan
argumentation oriented to persuading an audience. It is perhaps
most accurate to describe his project as uncovering the dynamic
intersubjective reality that subtends rhetorical exchanges even as
he advances his own cultural criticisms. These important
differences in focus clarify the similar use of the rhetorical
tradition by both thinkers. Read together, Nietzsche's rhetoric
and Gadamer's rhetorical engagement provide much need
assistance in the effort to develop a critical hermeneutics.
Given Gadamer's rather limited discussion of the rhetorical
tradition, Nietzsche is best deployed as a means of "completing"
Gadamer's rhetorical line of inquiry. Gadamer makes a vital
contribution to the postmodern destruction of the metaphysics of
presence by recuperating the rhetorical tradition's lesson that
reasonable inquiry is grounded in the hermeneutical situation of
limited horizons reaching understanding in a "fusion." Gadamer
consistently uses this rhetorical lesson to undermine subjectivity by
replacing demonstration with an intersubjective coming-to-
agreement. Nietzsche works from a similar ontological account,
but Nietzsche exemplifies the conversation partner who works to
break "free" of ordinary conversational constraints by subjecting
the conversation itself to rhetorical reassessment and invention.
Nietzsche brings the hermeneutics of suspicion to bear on the
rhetorical situation: because he is wary of his audience, he is
unwilling to accept the ordinary inventiveness that occurs in the
use of rhetorical commonplaces with which the audience
constitutes itself. He does not escape the commonplaces, of
course, but he strives to rework them in dramatic ways that reveal
their character as commonplaces. In short, Gadamer describes the
hermeneutical situation that subtends rhetorical engagement,
whereas Nietzsche immerses himself in these engagements as a
determined advocate seeking to unsettle traditional discourse.
Despite these contrasts with Gadamer's philosophy,
Nietzschean rhetoric is not just an exercise of raw power by an
insular speaker who callously manipulates his audience.
Nietzsche's rhetorical activity (and his philosophical approach to
rhetoric) is not a tool that he wields against inert adversaries, even
if his goal is to persuade them of their error rather than to learn
from them. He does not just overpower weaker minds with
''mere" rhetoric that he marshals in the service of some deeper,
subjectively-determined goal. Eugene Garver describes how
Aristotle's Rhetoric, which presents rhetoric as an art of character,
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underwrites the reasonableness of this kind of advocacy. 127
Although Nietzsche cannot demonstrate that the religious
fundamentalist is wrong in some absolute sense, he most assuredly
believed that his rhetorical engagement with religious
fundamentalists could reveal the superior reasonableness of his
account.'28 To be sure, Nietzsche rejects received wisdom about
the nature of rationality, but he does not abandon reason.
Nietzsche subverts the narrow conception of reason through
his message and his style, constantly challenging his readers with
destabilizing and dangerous "maybes." He is a determined
advocate who artfully seeks to persuade his audience to see the
merit in claims that pose a radical threat to received wisdom.
There is no hermeneutical generosity in his work; no embrace of
hermeneutical humility in an open dialogue oriented toward a
shared understanding. But this rhetorical approach is not
irrational or purely destructive. Gadamer's similar rhetorical
emphasis girds Nietzsche's argumentation by describing the
hermeneutical situation in which rhetorical engagement occurs.
Gadamer's ontological approach should not be mistaken for a
refusal to take sides and argue vigorously, but neither should one
mistake Nietzsche's vigorous advocacy as a refusal to acknowledge
his hermeneutical situatedness. Read together, they illuminate the
full dimensions of rhetorical engagement as intersubjective
situatedness and reasoned argumentation.
C. The Critical Power of Tradition
Nietzsche and Gadamer develop complementary approaches
to the rhetorical dimension of human understanding, but rhetorical
activities are not free-standing. Both thinkers regard tradition as
the backdrop for rhetorical exchanges that provides the resources
for critique. Claiming that one of the most productive points of
comparison of Nietzsche's and Gadamer's philosophies is the
critical power of tradition, Craig Beam argues that
127 EUGENE GARVER, ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC: AN ART OF CHARACTER (1994).
128 In this regard, see Eugene Garver, Why Should Anybody Listen?: The Rhetoric of
Religious Argument in Democracy, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 353 (2001). Garver argues
that the modernist prejudice to ban religious argumentation in the public square with the
goal of instituting a pluralistic civil society fails to recognize Aristotle's insight that
rhetorical advocacy can be reasonable. "One great advantage of the Rhetoric as a way of
talking about practical rationality is that it does not presuppose a definition of what is
rational, prior to considerations of effective persuasion. Criteria for rationality develop as
the art of rhetoric explores the nature of deliberation in its political context." id. at 366-
67.
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Nietzsche is the greatest of all counter-examples to the charge
that thinking in the light of tradition inevitably biases thought in
a conservative direction. Nietzsche, who was both a classicist
and a thinker who was profoundly radical, believed that one
needed the past, with its exemplars of excellence and untimely
otherness, in order to think critically about the present.129
This obviously resonates with Gadamer's central theme that all
understanding is traditionary understanding, and that engaging
with the central texts of a tradition is one of the most important
means for remaking the tradition. Although they think through
tradition in different ways, both philosophers place great
importance on the inevitability of thinking through tradition.
Gadamer's emphasis on traditionary understanding is central
to his philosophy. Although many criticize Gadamer for
celebrating a stagnant status quo, he uses tradition for precisely
the opposite purpose. By characterizing human existence as
hermeneutical, Gadamer argues that understanding is never
simply a matter of recovery of past truths, but instead emerges in
the fusion of horizons that occurs in rhetorical exchanges.
Tradition is not a reservoir of fixed truths that transparently
answer current questions, Gadamer argues, but rather is the
dynamic ground from which those answers are constructed in
response to the demands of the present.'3 °
Given his scathing critiques of Christianity and moral
philosophy, Nietzschean critique would appear to be far removed
from Gadamer's hermeneutical cultivation of the resources of
tradition. But Nietzsche employs a genealogical method, which by
definition is a traditionary inquiry that seeks to understand and
reconsider the present by thinking through the past. For example,
he acknowledges that Christianity cannot be overcome in the way
that we might overcome a dream by awakening to find that it is not
"real." We continue to live in a tradition that has been shaped
indelibly by Christianity, and the real issue is to interpret where we
are in this ongoing tradition.'3'
Genealogical critique is an aesthetic-rhetorical activity that
works as a disturbance from within traditional horizons rather than
as a commentary from outside a tradition under consideration, and
129 Beam, supra note 100, at 27.
131 1 have explained Gadamer's subtle analysis of tradition in some detail in Francis J.
Mootz Ill, The Quest to Reprogram Cultural Software: A Hermeneutical Response to Jack
Balkin's Theory of Ideology and Critique, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 945, 951-60 (2000).
131 Nietzsche repeatedly states that Christianity is not pure error, and that he is taking
issue with the bad interpretations of the Christian heritage that prevailed in the nineteenth
century. See, e.g., NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE, supra note 33, para. 78, at 132; id.
para. 358, at 310; id. at para. 377, at 338. See also supra note 97 and related textual
discussion.
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the tradition-bound character of this critique is deeply self-
reflexive. Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals not only sets
out to recover the invention and instantiation of the value
judgments "good" and "evil" in human history, it also recollects
and reassembles the origins of his argument in his earlier work
through allusion, direct reference, and even quotation. The point
is vividly made: even the genealogical scholar is enmeshed in an
ongoing history, which may itself be the subject of genealogical
critique. Nietzsche readily agrees that there is no clean break from
the tradition of Christian moralizing that he is criticizing.
But my point will have been taken-there is reason enough, all
in all, for our inability, as psychologists of today, to shake off a
degree of mistrust towards ourselves... We too are probably
still too good for our work, still the victims, the prey, the sick
men of this moralized taste of the time, however much we feel
ourselves to be those who despise it-it probably infects even
us.132
The obvious implication of Nietzsche's argument-that the critic
cannot speak from outside the tradition he criticizes-motivates
Nietzsche's rhetorical and aesthetic disposition within traditionary
understandings.
The problem of self-reflexive critique is unavoidable, but not
paralyzing. Nietzsche's Third Essay in the Genealogy presents an
extended interpretation of the historical emergence of the ascetic
ideal and what this ideal means to contemporary society. He
concludes that the ascetic ideal itself is an interpretation designed
to give meaning to life in the face of suffering, an interpretation of
transcendence and ideality that denies human life. In other words,
Nietzsche offers an interpretation (his genealogical critique) to
replace another interpretation (Christian morality). But Nietzsche
clearly does not regard these interpretations as equally infirm,
positioned in a relativistic standoff. Rather, Nietzsche's Third
Essay exemplifies the rhetorical engagement in which an aesthetic
interpretation proves itself not by reference to timeless truth, but
from within the rhetorical context. Nietzsche regards himself as an
untimely prophet of an interpretation now emerging to replace the
decadence into which asceticism has collapsed, and he vigorously
asserts that his interpretation is superior:
[The ascetic ideal promoted by Christianity] "is past, it has
conscience against it, it seems to all finer consciences indecent,
dishonest, deceitful, feminism, weakness, cowardice-in this
rigour, if in anything, we are good Europeans and heirs to
Europe's longest and boldest process of self-overcoming." . .
132 NIETZSCHE, supra note 58, Third Essay para. 20, at 116-17.
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There is no doubt that from now on morality will be destroyed
through the coming to consciousness of the will to truth: this is
the great drama in a hundred acts which is reserved for Europe
over the next two thousand years, the most fearful, most
questionable and perhaps also most hopeful of all dramas...
• . . We can no longer conceal from ourselves what this willing
directed by the ascetic ideal actually expresses in its
entirety.. .33
Nietzsche's certainty does not spring from the perception of truth,
but instead is the conviction of one attempting to persuade his
readers that his interpretation of tradition is the best
interpretation.
Traditionary understandings play a critical role in Nietzsche's
writings: not only as object for criticism but as the very medium of
critique. He heralds a new day that must remain linked with the
night of tradition: Christianity and morality are not defeated by
those who stand outside the tradition, but rather through
traditionary dynamism that Nietzsche believes cannot be ignored
any longer. Nietzschean critique does not represent a denial of the
power of tradition, since it is the tradition-in confrontation with
the questions posed by present circumstances-that speaks
through the genealogical critique. The connection between this
critical practice and Gadamer's philosophical analysis of the
unavoidable role that tradition plays in all human understanding
follows naturally from the previously discussed connections
between perspectivism and fusion of horizons, and between
rhetorical persuasion and rhetorical exchange. What emerges
from these connections are rough outlines of a critical
hermeneutics that draw both from Nietzschean critique and
Gadamerian hermeneutics.
There are productive linkages that can be drawn between
Nietzsche and Gadamer, because of-and not despite-their
differences. I have not attempted to subordinate either thinker to
the other; that would be counter-productive. My point is that
Nietzschean critique and Gadamerian hermeneutics reaffirm and
challenge each other in ways that lead to new understandings. To
explore these edifying possibilities in greater detail, I turn for
guidance to Gianni Vattimo, a philosopher who studied with
Gadamer and who considers himself to be a student of Nietzsche.
Read in light of my model comprised of Nietzschean critique and
philosophical hermeneutics, Vattimo's nihilistic philosophy
133 Id. paras. 27-28, at 135-36 (also appearing in FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE. THE GAY
SCIENCE, Book V para. 357 (1882/1887)).
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provides rich detail for my project of developing a critical
hermeneutics.
IV. A HERMENEUTICAL MODEL OF NIETZSCHEAN CRITIQUE:
VATTIMO'S "WEAK THOUGHT"
I am trying to propose arguments, which, even though they do
not claim to be definite descriptions of things as they really are,
seem to be reasonable interpretations of our condition here and
now. The rigour of post-metaphysical discourse consists in the
effort to cultivate an attitude of persuasion without proclaiming a
'universal" viewpoint, which is no viewpoint at all, an attitude
that is aware of coming from and addressing someone belonging
to the same process, of which it has no neutral vision but risks an
interpretation. In this case, a neutral reason is not only
impossible but literally senseless, as if one were to try to pull out
one's eyes in order to see things objectively.
-Gianni Vattimo34
Gianni Vattimo exemplifies the model of critical
hermeneutics that I am drawing from Gadamer and Nietzsche.
Specifically, Vattimo's nihilistic hermeneutics answers the
challenges posed to Gadamer by critical legal theorists such as
Allan Hutchinson. Under my reading, Vattimo's philosophy finds
its strength precisely by drawing on the points of convergence in
philosophical hermeneutics and Nietzschean critique,135 even if at
critical junctures Vattimo aligns himself with Nietzsche and
Heidegger and against Gadamer. I contend that Vattimo skillfully
avoids the aimless nihilism found in caricatures of Nietzsche and
the cultural conservatism found in caricatures of Gadamer. After
refining my model of critical legal hermeneutics through Vattimo's
work, I will employ the model as a touchstone for a critical analysis
of the Supreme Court's recent deliberation about gay rights.
Vattimo advocates a "nihilistic" philosophy of "weak
thought," in which philosophical thinking accepts its rhetorical role
as cultural criticism rather than continuing to assert its power to
134 GIANNI VATTIMO, BELIEF 46 (Luca D'lsanto & David Webb trans., 1999) (1996).
135 Vattimo expressly grants "Nietzsche a significant role in that philosophical strand
which begins with Schleiermacher, develops through Dilthey and German Historicism,
and continues through to Heidegger and post-Heideggerian hermeneutics (i.e., to
Gadamer, Ricoeur and Pareyson, to name only the most important figures)," and he
predicts "that the study of Nietzsche's philosophy will lead to a more precise definition of
the strangely unified character of 'hermeneutics' as a philosophical strand in nineteenth-
and twentieth-century culture." VATTIMO, supra note 48, at 5-6.
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deliver accurate and perspicacious descriptions of reality. In the
post-metaphysical age that Nietzsche helped inaugurate, critique
can only be thinking within a cultural horizon as a means of
recovering from unproductive prejudices (Verwindung: working
through a problem, surviving an ordeal) and can never be an
intellectual overcoming of a prejudiced horizon altogether
(Uberwindung: overcoming an obstacle, moving on).136  In this
respect, Vattimo continues philosophical thinking in the spirit of
Nietzsche's famous aphorism in section 54 of the Gay Science: now
that philosophy has "awakened" us to the knowledge that we are
still dreaming, all we can do is continue the dream. '37 By
embracing the "weak" character of philosophical thinking and
recognizing the provisional nature of its interventions into an
unfolding reality, postmodern critical theory embodies Nietzsche's
insight that the Enlightenment's quest for total demythologization
must fail:
The demythologization of demythologization ... may be taken
as the true moment of transition from the modern to the
postmodern. This transition occurs in its most philosophically
explicit form in Nietzsche. After him, after radical
demythologization, the experience of truth simply can no longer
be the same as before.1
38
To continue dreaming knowing that you are dreaming, as in the
passage from the Gay Science quoted above, is by no means the
same as purely and simply dreaming. And so it is with
demythologization. If we wish to be faithful to our historical
experience, we have to recognize that once demythologization
has been exposed as a myth, our relation to myth does not
return as naive as before, but remains marked by this
experience. 39
Nietzschean philosophical activity is cultural criticism, a
136 GIANNI VATITIMO, THE END OF MODERNITY: NIHILISM AND HERMENEUTICS IN
POSTMODERN CULTURE 164 (Jon R. Snyder trans., 1991) (1985) [hereinafter VAT'TIMO,
END OF MODERNITY]. Drawing from Heidegger, Vattimo insists: "Precisely this
difference between Verwindung and Oberwindung can help us to define in philosophical
terms the 'post-' in 'postmodernism'." See GIANNI VATI-IMO, AFTER CHRISTIANITY
(Luca D'Isanto trans., 2002) [hereinafter VATTIMO, AFTER CHRISTIANITY] (arguing that
Heidegger recognized that metaphysics "cannot be overcome but only verwunden-
accepted, distorted, and continued in ironic directions that are know to be provisional").
137 GIANNI VA'rrIMO, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY 9 (David Webb trans., 1992)
(1989). Nietzsche describes the effect of his insight that there is no essence behind "mere"
appearance with the metaphor of awakening to find oneself dreaming: "I suddenly woke
up in the midst of this dream, but only to the consciousness that I am dreaming and that I
must go on dreaming lest I perish ... " NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE, supra note 33,
Book I para. 54, at 116.
136 VATlIMO, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY, supra note 137, at 42.
139 Id. at 40.
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Verwindung that necessarily occurs within a plural world from
which metaphysical thinking cannot rescue us.
Vattimo's philosophical orientation responds to Hutchinson's
critique of hermeneutical philosophy. Hutchinson criticizes
hermeneutics for eliding the political dimensions of law either by
promoting complacent extensions of traditional understandings, 40
or by promoting a nihilistic collapse of meaning.' Hutchinson
credits Gadamer with attempting to steer a course between these
false ,alternatives, but ultimately concludes that Gadamer reverts
to a conservative position that undermines political action.'42 In
the end, though, Hutchinson is left only with a commitment to
politics and the paradoxical acknowledgments that political
interventions must be historical without being historicist, cannot
be directed by a sovereign cogito, and cannot claim to be
underwritten by determinate groundings or metaphysical
guarantees. Vattimo's philosophy exemplifies the self-
understanding of political critique in the post-metaphysical age by
carrying forward the themes that I identified in reading Gadamer
and Nietzsche together, and he demonstrates that Hutchinson's
challenge to Gadamer's hermeneutics can be met.
Vattimo's signature insight generally is phrased as a
Nietzschean criticism of Gadamer's hermeneutics. Vattimo agrees
that all understanding is hermeneutical, but he emphasizes that
only Nietzsche fully understands the self-reflexive nature of this
claim. Gadamer's hermeneutics urbanizes Heidegger's more
radical philosophizing, Vattimo charges, by claiming to deliver an
ontological account of human existence that is a "true description
of the permanent 'interpretive structure' of human existence."'43
Vattimo readily credits Gadamer with persuasively rejecting
Habermas's excessive rationalism while also steadfastly refusing to
endorse a crude hermeneutic conventionalism, but he contends
that Gadamer ultimately presents his philosophical hermeneutics
as a metaphysical truth in the tradition of Western philosophizing.
This is misguided, Vattimo insists, because if hermeneutics "wishes
to be consistent with its own rejection of metaphysics" it can only
"present itself as the most persuasive philosophical interpretation
of a situation or 'epoch'. . . ."'" In other words, hermeneutic
philosophy must acknowledge that the value of hermeneutic
140 See supra notes 11, 14-15 (criticizing James Boyd White).
141 See supra notes 12-13 (criticizing Sanford Levinson).
142 See supra notes 24-32 (criticizing my Gadamerian reading of Justice Souter's opinion
in the "right to die" cases).
143 GIANNI VATrIMO, BEYOND INTERPRETATION: THE MEANING OF
HERMENEUTICS FOR PHILOSOPHY 6 (David Webb trans., 1997) (1994).
144 Id. at 10.
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arguments is not in revealing bedrock truths, but rather "in being
able to establish a coherent picture we can share while waiting for
others to propose a more plausible alternative." '145
Vattimo's critique of Gadamer misses the mark when
Gadamer is read together with Nietzsche. Vattimo admits that
Nietzsche's philosophy appears to be fundamentally at odds with
itself by promoting an ontological account of perspectivism, and
that this paradox is resolved by construing Nietzsche as a
rhetorician rather than a metaphysician.'46 As I have argued above
at some length, it does no violence to Gadamer's texts to read his
philosophy in the same manner. Gadamer's ontological claims
about the interpretive character of life are rhetorical moves against
a dominant myth that no longer effectively organizes experience.
Just as Nietzsche announced the death of God as a cultural event
that already has taken place, Gadamer announced the death of
positivism as a cultural event that already has played itself out.
Gadamer, no less than Nietzsche, is attentive to the genealogy of
the cultural crisis that he addresses. Truth and Method carefully
recounts this genealogy while simultaneously highlighting the
suppressed resources of tradition that point the way beyond the
unsatisfactory status quo. Vattimo's resolute acceptance of the
provisional character of all critical insights uncovers the motivating
perspective that drives both Nietzsche and Gadamer, even if they
were unable to voice their positions clearly.'47 Although phrased
as a critique of Gadamer, then, Vattimo's hermeneutic nihilism
illustrates the value of reading Gadamer and Nietzsche together.
By expressly abandoning any fixed ground for critique,
Vattimo's nihilistic philosophy might appear to disable critical
theory in the manner that Hutchinson decries. But it is precisely by
avoiding sterile metaphysics, Vattimo contends, that his radically
nihilistic hermeneutical philosophy embraces the critical and
ethical dimensions of thinking. Hermeneutical philosophy must
acknowledge that it cannot rise above its historical circumstances,
and must embrace its role in generating a Verwindung within our
cultural moment:
Hermeneutics can live up to its ethical inclination in an
appropriate fashion only be remaining faithful to the instance of
115 Id. at 11.
46 See supra note 67.
147 This is one point where Gadamer's decision not to engage Nietzsche as an
interlocutor proves to be a hindrance to Gadamer's efforts, since Nietzsche's paradoxes
are hermeneutical in nature. Vattimo's hermeneutic nihilism works through paradoxes
that Nietzsche and Gadamer share, even if they come at the problems from different
angles. Although Vattimo "sides" with Nietzsche, then, his solution carries equal force in
interpreting Gadamer's philosophy.
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historicality. But how? Principally, by thinking of itself not as
an ultimately metaphysical descriptive theory of the
hermeneutic constitution of existence, but rather as an event of
destiny. Hermeneutics must recognize itself as the thought
belonging to the epoch of the end of metaphysics, and nothing
more. Hermeneutics is not the adequate description of the
human condition, which is finally making headway only at a
certain point in history, thanks to a particular thinker or a series
of fortuitous circumstances. . . . If it theorizes that the
experience of truth is belonging and not reflection, it must also
say to which epoch, world or provenance it itself as theory
belongs.148
If... the "trivial" and weak hermeneutic thesis recognizes
itself as belonging, instead of disguising itself as a metaphysical
description, then it will see itself as a destiny (a provenance)
and will become capable of choice, that is, of morality.
Hermeneutics will recognize its destiny, if it understands the
nihilistic character of its constitution. 49
The Verwindung of modernity is a fundametally ironic
gesture that rejects any heroic or romantic posture vis-a-vis the
Western tradition. The decline of modernity, however, also
opens up the opportunity for a new,-but weakly new-
beginning for thought, and this is what permits us to consider
philosophical nihilism a responsible, rather than a despairing,
response to the crisis of the contemporary world.15
Because philosophy cannot pretend to dictate answers that are
logically derived from essential foundations, it now sees itself as a
political and ethical activity, undertaking what Vattimo calls an
"ontology of actuality. ' 15  Hermeneutic philosophy, as an
interpretation that seeks to be persuasive under conditions of
"contingency, freedom, and risk," '152 generates a critical
intervention into political and ethical matters.
Vattimo's approach to critical philosophy problematizes the
concept of truth. As he poses the question, Heidegger's radical
thinking leads us to ask whether hermeneutics necessarily must be
"relativist, anti-intellectualist, irrationalist, and at best
traditionalist," '153 since truth is not a correspondence to a fixed
reality, nor is it a consensus that emerges from a historical process
of enlightenment. Vattimo responds by characterizing truth as
148 VATTIMO, supra note 137, at 113.
149 Id. at 114.
1-0 Jon R. Snyder, Translator's Introduction to VATTIMO, END OF MODERNITY, supra
note 136, at vi, 1.
151 Gianni Vattimo, Philosophy, Metaphysics, Democracy, 10 QuI PARLE 1, 5 (Paul
Kottman trans., 1997).
152 Id. at 7.
153 VATTIMO, supra note 143, at 75.
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dwelling within the groundless abyss of a dynamic tradition, a
dwelling that implies "an interpretative belonging which involves
both consensus and the possibility of critical activity.1154 Vattimo,
like Nietzsche and Gadamer before him, characterizes the
experience of art as the exemplar of the edifying and challenging
experience of truth as dwelling. He rejects classical accounts of
aesthetics that depend on "images of integration, harmony and
well-roundedness," and which would lead hermeneutical
philosophy toward a metaphysical "idealization of the beautiful
ethical life." '55  Reclaiming Heideggerian radicalism, he
characterizes the experience of art as a disruptive opening, as an
event of disclosure and concealment within ongoing
interpretations that points the way to a different conception of
truth.
Recognizing that hermeneutical philosophy surrenders its
radical edge if it becomes nothing more than irrational
aestheticism, Vattimo celebrates Gadamer's steadfast attack on
aesthetic consciousness and acknowledges the very real danger of
aestheticism that might follow from Nietzsche's philosophical
performances (and, more recently, Derrida's deconstructive
performances).'56 But Vattimo also rejects Gadamer's implicit
claim to provide a phenomenological account that is "founded on
an objective, metaphysically true and adequate, description of
what hermeneutical experience is really of-which would be an
obvious contradiction, given the polemic directed in Truth and
Method against every pretence of science and philosophy to
provide an 'objective' description of reality."'57 The middle course
charted by Vattimo parallels my efforts to read Nietzsche and
Gadamer together. Reason and critique are intertwined features
of Verwindung, not an Uberwindung that is accomplished by a
sovereign cogito. Reason inheres in the historical effort to
reconstruct and project our thrownness. Vattimo concludes that
this account of rationality
consists in the fact that, essentially involved in a process (into
which we are always-already 'thrown') we always-already know,
at least to a certain extent, where we are going and how we
must go there. But to orient ourselves, we need to reconstruct
and interpret the process in as complete and persuasive a
manner as possible. It would be an error to believe that we can
jump outside the process, somehow grasping the arche, the
principle, the essence or the ultimate structure. Rationality is
114 Id. at 82.
155 Id. at 87.
156 Id. at 99-101.
157 Id. at 103.
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simply the guiding thread that can be comprehended by
listening attentively to the messages of the Schickung. Both the
theoretical choice for hermeneutics and the specific choices of
our interpretive activity can be justified by argumentation on
this basis.'58
Hermeneutics acknowledges that reason is not limited to scientific
argumentation, but neither is it a pure aestheticism; rather, reason
just is the movement of interpretation and critique that later
comes to regard itself as an object in hermeneutical
philosophizing.59
158 Id. at 109.
159 Id. at 111. Vattimo argues that Nietzsche connects science and art as dispositions
that attend to the constructed nature of existence.
In a more developed form the interest and the pleasure comes to life in [the
scientist], which art has taught us over the centuries, namely to observe life in all
its forms. With this interest and pleasure we counter the development of errors,
from which the world of appearances arises, in those moments when we raise
ourselves above them. This long education through art has prepared the ground
for science and the free spirit, and both must therefore be grateful to art.
VATIMO, supra note 48, at 55. See generally supra note 48.
This insight undermines Vattimo's sharp criticism of Gadamer's celebration of art as
promoting Erfahrung (a life-shaping experience that affects one's ongoing interpretations
of the world) rather than merely Erlebnis (a discrete and immediate experience that
cannot be fully elaborated through exegesis). See VATrIMO, END OF MODERNITY, supra
note 136, at 121-28, and VATrIMO, supra note 143, at 58-74. Vattimo argues that
Gadamer courts a neo-humanist philosophy of history that elides the more radical
nihilistic challenges of Nietzsche and Heidegger. See VATTIMO, END OF MODERNITY,
supra note 136, at 114-15. However, Gadamer well recognizes the "shock" by which art
can pull one away from prejudices with critical understanding, and he does not celebrate
an historically unfolding humanism. Gadamer's point is that the fundamental challenge
posed by great art is challenging because it is at once intimately present to the individual
yet also unyielding to simplistic absorptions into the individual's pre-existing horizon
precisely because the destabilizing challenge of art is forward looking. See GADAMER,
supra note 1, at 55-81, 346-62 (contrasting Erlebnis and Erfahrung). Gadamer insists that
the meaning of art is always a surprise in which everything
familiar is eclipsed. To understand what the work of art says to us is therefore a
self-encounter. But as an encounter with the authentic, as a familiarity that
includes surprise, the experience of art is experience in a real sense and must
master ever anew the task that experience involves: the task of integrating it into
the whole of one's own orientation to a world and one's own self-understanding.
The intimacy with which the work of art touches us is at the same time, in
enigmatic fashion, a shattering and a demolition of the familiar. It is not only
the "This art thou!" disclosed in a joyous and frightening shock; it also says to us;
"Thou must alter thy life!"
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Aesthetics and Hermeneutics, in PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS,
supra note 122, at 101-02, 104. Art demonstrates in particularly vivid ways the
intertwining of the deconstructive and reconstructive, underscoring that we cannot
attempt to achieve a kind of pure critique (or experience of critique, in the manner of
experience designated by Erlebnis) that is not part of the ongoing myth-making by which
life proceeds. Gadamer's rejection of aesthetics in favor of the experience engendered by
the work of art connects with Nietzsche's demythologization through the (unavoidable)
lived experience of myth. It is celebrating discrete nihilistic breaks and ruptures that
threatens to inspire humanistic and romantic tendencies, rather than Gadamer's
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Vattimo's critique of religion provides the most cogent
example of his conception of philosophy as cultural criticism. By
demythologizing objectivism, Vattimo observes, nihilistic
philosophy lends fresh plausibility to religion at a time when the
dissembling forces of globalization generate a longing for
something vital as an antidote to the emptiness of modernity. 60
Claiming that the "end of metaphysics and the death of the moral
God have liquidated the philosophical basis of atheism," Vattimo
argues that belief suddenly is possible again. 6  Weak thought
liberates religion from God, which is to say that it liberates religion
from the philosophical constructions of God as sovereign deity,
metaphysical truth, and so on, and makes belief plausible.
But Vattimo claims an even stronger connection between
religion and his philosophy: "Hermeneutics can be what it is-a
non-metaphysical philosophy with an essentially interpretive
attitude towards truth, and thus a nihilistic ontology-only as heir
to the Christian myth of the incarnation of God." '62  This
paradoxical and surprising situation, in which religion returns to
the forefront of social life, is not an ontological necessity but
rather a historical development.
Perhaps not by its essential nature, but de facto.... religion
comes to be experienced as a return. In religion, something
that we had thought irrevocably forgotten is made present
again, a dormant trace is reawakened, a wound re-opened, the
repressed returns and what we took to be an Uberwindung
(overcoming, realization and thus a setting aside [of religion by
philosophy]) is no more than a Verwindung, a long
convalescence that has once again come to terms with the
indelible trace of its sickness.1"3
Vattimo chronicles the return of religion in the wake of the death
of God, arguing that nihilistic hermeneutical philosophy embodies
the kenosis of the divine and opens the possibility for realizing (in
acknowledgment that the experience of art is part of an ongoing self-understanding that
always lurks behind our consciously-directed critical postures.
160 Gianni Vattimo, The Trace of the Trace, in RELIGION 79-94, 80-81 (Jacques Derrida
& Gianni Vattimo eds., David Webb trans., 1998). See also VATI|MO, supra note 143, at
42-57.
161 VATTIMO, AFTER CHRISTIANITY, supra note 136, at 17. In other words, the "fact is
that the decline of the great metanarratives ... has put an end, too, to the strong reasons
for philosophical atheism." Id. at 86.
162 VATTIMO, supra note 143, at 54. Vattimo acknowledges the "paradox of having
recovered Christianity-in the form of believing that I believe-through Nietzsche and
Heidegger," VATTIMO, AFTER CHRISTIANITY, supra note 136, at 3, but reaffirms that
Heidegger's response to a call can be interpreted as a response to the Judeo-Christian
tradition.
13 Vattimo, supra note 160, at 79.
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a new way) the central Christian principle of charity.'64
The return of religion exemplifies Nietzsche's doctrine of the
eternal return, but Vattimo stresses that we can and should
joyously embrace this return as nihilistic practitioners of the gay
science, in which the cycle of the "same" is transformed. The
doctrines of "will to power" and "eternal recurrence of the same"
do not drive Nietzsche to nihilistic despair. Vattimo emphasizes
that Nietzsche's philosophy points beyond deconstructions and
refutations and toward defining the good temperament and
lightness of being that should follow the acknowledgment of the
eternal recurrence:165
Even when Nietzsche concedes that the doctrines of Will to
Power and Eternal Recurrence are themselves only
interpretations, he does not in fact believe that they have the
same status as any old interpretation: for instance, he does not
believe that the interpretation called Will to Power is on a par
with the one called "Christian morality". Perspectivism-
another term Nietzsche uses to characterize the thought of his
final creative period-does not in fact mean that the theory
itself, which maintains a plurality of perspectives, should not
and must not make a selection from among these perspectives.
The theory must at least decide between itself and the many
other interpretations available.
The criteria for making such a decision, which Nietzsche
cites again and again, are of a "physiological" nature: strength-
weakness, health-sickness, as well as the related ideas of
creativity-"ressentiment" and active-reactive. Strictly
speaking, the rejection of metaphysics on account of the errors
underlying it cannot be attributed to Nietzsche, since according
to him error is vital to life and since in his eyes there is no
"truth" which would be "more valuable" than error, and to
which one could appeal in order to get beyond error. When
morality's metaphysical lie is exposed by the changes in the
conditions of life and of morality's logic and when God "dies",
not to acknowledge this is more a sign of physiological
degeneration and poor health than is the refusal to
acknowledge a truth consisting of facts. Strength and weakness,
health and sickness are the only criteria that Nietzsche has left
after unmasking metaphysics.'66
Gadamer's philosophical legacy proves to be important for
Vattimo at this point, even if in a subterranean manner. 167 During
164 See generally VATTIMO, supra note 134.
165 VATTIMO, supra note 48, at 82-86.
166 Id. at 126-27.
167 In his contribution to a Festschrift in celebration of Gadamer's one-hundredth
birthday, Vattimo acknowledges that the "current configuration" of hermeneutics "is
mostly the result of Gadamer's work." Gianni Vattimo, Gadamer and the Problem of
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his long career, Gadamer emphasized that moving beyond the
Enlightenment's "prejudice against prejudice" does not mean that
one is fated to accept an endless nihilistic confrontation between
equally prejudiced beliefs. Instead, as exemplified in the
experience of art, hermeneutical engagement shatters the
interpreter's prejudiced horizon in a manner that permits her to
gain perspective on certain "unproductive prejudices" and to move
forward. This contemplative attitude, this good conscience, is an
openness to the perspectivity of the Being and the relinquishment
of the certainty of metaphysical schemas. Gadamer believes that
this can be achieved only through a willingness to enter a
conversation and to learn from the other (person, text, or culture)
in a playful dialogic encounter that is not methodologically
scripted. It is precisely this social dimension of reason that
augments Nietzsche's work and highlights the possibility and
genesis of Verwindung after we have awakened to realize that the
dream of a theoretical and monological Oberwindung is
impossible.
Vattimo's philosophy exemplifies the model of critical
hermeneutics that I derived from reading Nietzsche and Gadamer
together. Critical theory is a movement within a prejudiced
horizon rather than overcoming one's horizon. Gadamer's
hermeneutical philosophy is best read not as advocating reverence
for traditional understandings, but rather as acknowledging that
tradition is a linguistically structured and contested medium
through which understanding takes place. Nietzsche's critical
philosophy is best read, not as claiming to have discovered
bedrock reality through philosophical analysis, but rather as
acknowledging that reality is hermeneutically structured and
therefore dynamic rather than stable. Vattimo offers an approach
to critical theory that brings together these insights and points the
way toward rethinking the role of critical legal theory.
Ontology, in GADAMER'S CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HANS-GEORG GADAMER
299-306 (Jeff Malpas et al. eds., Stefano Franchi trans., 2002). However, Vattimo urges a
more productive reading of Gadamer's work that rejects the tendency toward a
metaphysical description of an interpretive reality and embraces an "ontology of
actuality" in which hermeneutical philosophy acknowledges that it is part of a play of
interpretations that has effects and ethical significance. Id. at 305-06. My thesis is that
Gadamer has empowered Vattimo to see this reading of Gadamer's work, and that
Vattimo's attention to Nietzsche need not be viewed as being at odds with his orientation
within Gadamerian hermeneutics.
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V. THE GAY SCIENCE OF LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: CRITIQUE
AND THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS
The Gay Science can be read as a treatise on law and those who
would write against the law.
A Gay Science would carry forward the passion of Critical Legal
Studies, but in a different way. It would accept that life in law is
defined by principles and rules that determine and restrain
interpretative activity and political possibility, but it would see
this as the challenge to the joyous interpreter to develop counter
strategies within the law. A Gay Science would insist that the
only authenticity is that of a mood, of a sensibility that informs
the world.-
Adam Gearey'6
What conclusions about critical legal theory can be drawn
from my readings of Gadamer, Nietzsche and Vattimo? To this
point my exegesis has been abstracted from legal practice. At this
level of generality it is easy to understand that these thinkers reject
the urge to engage in modernist "strong" theory, but it is difficult
to discern what it might mean for pursuing the possibilities of
"weak" critical theory within law. By bringing my discussion to
bear in the practical context of a legal dispute, however, it is
possible to locate important lessons for legal theorists. I explore
the implications of my Nietzschean-Gadamerian model of critical
legal hermeneutics through a discussion of three United States
Supreme Court cases that have grappled with the constitutional
issues that circle around the question of the legal status of gays and
lesbians. My thesis is that a critical legal hermeneutics provides
not only substantial descriptive clarification of these cases, but also
inspiration for effective critical intervention. Critical insight is
possible even if (or, more precisely, because) my model of critical
legal hermeneutics does not pretend to offer an interpretive
methodology that delivers unimpeachably correct answers to
specific legal questions. Due to the high profile nature of these
cases and the relative degree of self-reflection apparent in the
judicial opinions, these cases provide strong evidence supporting
the model of critical legal hermeneutics on their own terms, and do
not require much reading against the grain.
168 Adam Gearey, We Fearless Ones: Nietzsche and Critical Legal Studies, 11 LAW &
CRITIQUE 167, 169, 184 (2000).
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In 1986, the Court held in Bowers v. Hardwick 6,19 a 5-4
decision, that a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy did not
violate the United States Constitution when it was applied to an
adult man who engaged in consensual sexual activity with another
man in his bedroom. The majority made clear that Georgia could
choose to criminalize acts that it determined to be immoral. Ten
years later, in Romer v. Evans,7 ' the Court again decided by a 5-4
margin that a Constitutional referendum enacted by the citizens of
Colorado to preclude municipal measures designed to prohibit
discrimination against homosexuals in public accommodations was
unconstitutional. The Court found that the referendum was
motivated by animus against gays and lesbians and was not
rationally related to any legitimate state purpose. Finally, just four
years after Romer, the Court again voted 5-4 in Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale"' that a New Jersey anti-discrimination statute
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was
unconstitutionally applied to prohibit the Boy Scouts from
refusing to allow a gay man to serve as a scout leader. The Court
concluded that the Boy Scouts organization has a First
Amendment right of association to exclude homosexuals from its
leadership positions.
The tangled history of these three cases has received extensive
scholarly attention, but I do not intend to offer a detailed analysis
of the legal rationales in the various opinions and in the numerous
scholarly assessments. My goal is to show that the legal reasoning
exhibited in these cases is consistent with my model of critical legal
hermeneutics, and also that these cases illuminate the role that
critical legal theory can play under this model. My discussion is
schematic and suggestive, therefore, rather than doctrinal. It is
precisely by resisting the urge to declare the truth of the matter, to
demarcate methodologically permissible and impermissible legal
interpretations, that enables critical legal hermeneutics to gain
purchase beyond the artificial realm of the ivory tower. My
discussion of these cases shows the power that critique holds as an
interpretation offered within a play of interpretations, and rejects
the belief that theorists can or should attempt to rise above
interpretive activity to prescribe correct interpretations.
I begin by contending that these cases clearly exhibit the
rhetorical nature of legal argumentation that is revealed by
reading Gadamer and Nietzsche together. In particular, they
exemplify the rhetorical lesson that how one frames a question
169 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
170 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
7' 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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largely determines the answer that one generates.72  The
seemingly mundane and technical observation that adroitly
framing the question is an important part of argumentation, often
taught to students in advocacy courses as a technique for
increasing their ability to be persuasive in pursuit of the pre-
determined goal of victory for their client, in fact reveals
something about the nature of legal argumentation that runs much
deeper than superficial rhetorical strategizing. Nietzsche's
dramatic efforts to persuade his readers complements Gadamer's
ontological focus on the dialogic nature of human understanding.
Framing the question in issue is not a matter of demarcating the
perspicacious features of the world-in-itself that can later be
investigated, but rather is the activity of rhetorical engagement
that provides us with a world in the first instance.
In Bowers, Justice White's analysis and conclusion for the
majority follow naturally from his starting point that the issue
presented was "whether the Federal Constitution confers a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and
hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such
conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time."'73 Having
framed the question in this way, the Court is able to distance itself
from the issue of "whether laws against sodomy between
consenting adults in general, or between homosexuals in
particular, are wise or desirable," '74 and to proceed by
demonstrating the obvious point that the Constitution cannot be
fairly read within the American Constitutional tradition as
conferring an affirmative right to engage in homosexual sodomy.
The tenor of the opinion is that of a reluctant political actor who
must respect the division of judiciary and legislature, suggesting
that although the Court may disagree with the impulses of the
Georgia legislature it does not have a legitimate political role to
play in such matters. The holding naturally follows: because laws
criminalizing sodomy are rooted in ancient moral values, they are
the rational products of legislative acts that cannot fairly be said to
contravene fundamental liberties that are deeply rooted in
American legal and social traditions.'75
172 Cf. MICHEL MEYER, RHETORIC, LANGUAGE, AND REASON (1994) (advocating an
approach to philosophy that he characterizes as "problematology," which is devoted to
investigating the central role played by questions in reasoning and overcoming the
traditional privileging of answers as the focus of philosophy).
'73 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
174 Id.
171 Id. at 191-93. Chief Justice Burger's infamous concurring opinion emphatically
underscores the narrow holding that "there is no such thing as a fundamental right to
commit homosexual sodomy," id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring), but makes it more
2003] 1029
HeinOnline -- 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1029 2002-2003
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion attacks the majority's
formulation of the question directly and caustically:
A fair reading of the statute and of the complaint clearly reveals
that the majority has distorted the question this case presents.
... The Court claims that its decision today merely refuses to
recognize a fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy; what the Court really has refused to recognize is the
fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the
nature of their intimate associations with others.
... I can only hope that ... the Court soon will reconsider its
analysis and conclude that depriving individuals of the right to
choose for themselves how to conduct their intimate
relationships poses a far greater threat to the values most
deeply rooted in our Nation's history than tolerance of
nonconformity could ever do. 76
Blackmun's challenge openly embraces the rhetorical character of
decision-making and expressly re-frames the question as whether
time-honored moral condemnations of the majority of citizens
outweigh dynamic constitutional principles of privacy and
individual self-determination. The dissent steps back from the
specific facts of the case involving consensual sex between gay
men, and constructs the issue in terms of the scope of privacy for
intimate relations generally. The fact that the question comes to
the court in the context of an arrest of two gay men ostensibly does
not figure in this approach.177
The Bowers case provides a stark reminder of the nature of
legal argumentation. It is easy to lampoon the myth that legal
conclusions are generated deductively by placing the facts under a
conceptual rubric of legal principles, but it is easy to miss the deep
critique that the facts, legal principles and analytical moves all are
rhetorically constructed. The majority and dissent both strive to
prevent Bowers from being a case about an abstract conception of
gay rights, much to the chagrin of several of the Justices on each
side of the case. The primary opinions on both sides of the
decision transparently create the legal disputes that they are
clear that he sees no role for the court to "cast aside millennia of moral teaching." Id. at
197.
176 Id. at 200, 206, 214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
177 The separate dissenting opinion authored by Justice Stevens focuses on the selective
enforcement of the statute against gays and directly takes up the question of the
constitutionality of targeting disfavored groups through application of broadly worded
statutes. Id. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A policy of selective application must be
supported by a neutral and legitimate interest-something more substantial than a
habitual dislike for, or ignorance about, the disfavored group.").
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prepared to countenance and decide. Bowers quite expressly
demonstrates that the law is not a resource for making decisions
when disputes arise, but rather is the activity of framing disputes
and then making judgments.
The rhetorical reality of legal decisionmaking is no less
apparent in the other two cases. In Romer, Justice Kennedy
carefully refused to grant protected class status to gays and
lesbians that would support application of a "strict scrutiny"
standard, finding instead that the constitutional referendum
failed-in fact, "defied"-the lesser constitutional requirement
that legislation bear a "rational relation" to legitimate state
interests.'78 But even by framing the question in this manner, he
could not justify the majority's holding without concluding, at a
minimum, that legislation having no purpose other than
disenfranchising disfavored groups as an expression of the animus
of the majority of citizens is unconstitutional. 7 ' Justice Scalia's
characteristically scathing dissent cut through this circumlocution
with a determined logical rigor: given the unchallenged Bowers
holding that a state may criminalize homosexual activity, he
argued that it must be the case that a state may enact laws that
merely disfavor homosexual conduct by prohibiting municipalities
from conferring favored status on individuals "because of their
homosexual conduct."'8  Although Kennedy and Scalia openly
spar over the legitimacy of legislatively targeting gays and lesbians,
in the end they propose competing general characterizations of the
question presented by the case. Kennedy declares the Colorado
constitutional amendment unconstitutional because it precludes
171 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625, 631-32 (1996) (contrasting the "strict scrutiny"
review by the Colorado Supreme Court with the "rational relation" review employed by
the Court).
179 Justice Kennedy reasoned:
First, the [constitutional] amendment [enacted by referendum] has the peculiar
property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named
group, an exceptional and, as we shall explain, invalid form of legislation.
Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that
the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it
affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.
A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens
than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal
protection of the laws in the most literal sense.
... We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further
a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This
Colorardo cannot do. A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its
laws.
Id. at 632, 633, 635.
181) Id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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democratic political activities by a minority group for no reason
other than animus against the group. In contrast, Scalia argues
that the case questions the limits of judicial power to overturn
democratic recognitions of "traditional American moral values,"
arguing that constitutionally precluding those who engage in
morally disfavored activity from gaining "special protections"
under municipal anti-discrimination laws reflects political
decisions removed from the Court's purview.
The same situation holds true in Dale, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist begins his analysis by phrasing the question as whether
a state may constitutionally prevent an organization from
espousing views about the morality of homosexuality.' Rehnquist
concludes that requiring the Boy Scouts to retain a gay scout
leader is tantamount to interfering with the organization's message
that homosexuality is not "morally straight," and that the Court
"cannot doubt that the Boy Scouts sincerely holds this view."'82
Justice Stevens begins his dissent by undermining Rehnquist's
transparent assumption, asking whether an organization may avoid
application of state anti-discrimination statutes simply by declaring
that its aversion to having gay scout leaders is part of the
organization's shared goal in disapproving of homosexuality.'83 His
opinion carefully reviews the facts of record to conclude that the
Boy Scouts organization "is simply silent on homosexuality. There
is no shared goal or collective effort to foster a belief about
homosexuality at all-let alone one this is significantly burdened
by admitting homosexuals."'8 4  Because Justice Stevens quite
openly declares that the majority feeds on outmoded prejudices
against gays and lesbians to support base prejudice by the Boy
Scouts unrelated to any genuine expressive goal,"5 Justice Souter
wrote separately for the other three dissenters to insist that the
current social acceptability of the message purportedly espoused
by the group is irrelevant to the analysis."8 6 Once again, the
181 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48 (2000).
182 Id. at 651, 653.
183 Id. at 683-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184 Id. at 684.
185 Id. at 688-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens notes that the Boy Scouts might have
a different case if Dale repeated his advocacy for gay rights as part of a college
organization in the context of his leadership role with the Scouts, or if the Boy Scouts
determined to expel any person-regardless of that person's sexual orientation-who
openly advocated for gay rights. Instead, he concludes, the "only apparent explanation
for the majority's holding ... is that homosexuals are simply so different from the rest of
society that their presence alone-unlike any other individual's-should be singled out for
special First Amendment treatment," id. at 696, a perspective that he later labels an
"atavistic opinion[]," id. at 699.
186 Id. at 701 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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rhetorical framing at work in these opinions shapes the relevant
facts, the categorization of the legal issue, the analysis, and the
conclusion. It is manifest that there are myriad ways in each of
these cases in which these elements could be framed differently.
These cases illustrate that it is in rhetorical engagement that
perspectives are revealed and horizons are fused. Nietzsche's
rhetorical advocacy and Gadamer's investigation of the
rhetorically-secured bonds of community are both necessary in
understanding the dynamic of legal reasoning as exhibited in these
cases. It takes hardly any effort to point out the strategies invoked
by Justices on both sides of each case in their search for the
grounds of persuasion. But if law is nothing more than rhetorical
activity in this sense, there is reason to fear that the caricatures of
Nietzsche's perspectivism might gain purchase and lead to
nihilism. Gadamer's philosophy provides the resources to see the
degree to which this rhetorical advocacy necessarily is founded in
community, within which the variegated horizons that comprise a
tradition might fuse in the never-complete and always-provisional
activity of understanding. Gadamer does not endorse a simple-
minded idealism, in which vigorous advocates suddenly reach a
shared answer that causes their differences to disappear
effortlessly. Instead, he recognizes that the activity of persuading
is always predicated on understanding one's audience, which
means that one's position is pre-figured and then altered in the
course of persuasive discourse. In short, the rhetorical character
of legal reasoning exemplifies the need for Nietzsche's perspectival
wariness and Gadamer's hermeneutical charity.
These themes are particularly vivid in the awkward effort by
the Justices in Romer to accommodate not only the preceding
tradition generally, but the Bowers precedent specifically. Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion does not mention Bowers,"7 although
the case clearly loomed large in the minds of all concerned. He
carefully distinguishes singling out insular groups for political
disestablishment based on personal characteristics from the
criminalization of sodomistic acts. But of course, this merely
recalls the initial reluctance of the Bowers Court to countenance
the fact that a criminal statue facially applicable to sodomy by any
two persons in fact was being used by the state as a means for
selectively harassing gay men.' And Justice Scalia's dissent is too
187 Justice Scalia declares that the "case most relevant to the issue before us today is not
even mentioned in the Court's opinion," and then declares the Bowers holding to be
"unassailable, except by those who think that the Constitution changes to suit current
fashions." Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640-41 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188 Justice Stevens hints at this dimension of the case after noting that the state
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gleeful in equating the cases on the grounds that the legitimation
of anti-gay beliefs in Bowers necessarily translates to what he
contends is a much less drastic expression of the same anti-gay
beliefs that is under review in Romer.8 While Justice Kennedy's
opinion in Romer suggested that there was no rational basis for
precluding political activity at the municipal level to prevent
discrimination against gays and lesbians, the premise of Bowers
was that it is entirely rational for a state to enact moral
condemnations into law. As Justice White concluded in Bowers,
the law "is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws
representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under
the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed."'
In addition to the rhetorical character of legal reasoning,
these cases also reveal the dynamic and polysemic character of the
legal tradition that fosters critical insight even in the absence of an
invariant criterion of judgment. In other words, the practice of
rhetorical elaboration in legal practice necessarily carries forward
and has continuing effects, but these effects are simultaneously
stabilizing and de-stabilizing. Phrased in Gadamerian terms,
rhetorical elaboration is always pre-figured by history and itself
has a history of effects, but rhetorical engagement does not unfold
conceded that application of the statute to married couples would be unconstitutional and
that it in fact was declining to continue the prosecution of the named defendant, Michael
Bowers. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 220 n.13 (1986):
Indeed, at this [early] stage [of the litigation], it appears that the statute
indiscriminately authorizes a policy of selective prosecution that is neither
limited to the class of homosexual persons nor embraces all persons in that class,
but rather applies to those who may be arbitrarily selected by the prosecutor for
reasons that are not revealed either in the record of this case or in the text of the
statute.
Id. Subsequent details about the facts leading to the arrest of Michael Hardwick confirm
that he was targeted for arrest as a result of anti-gay animus that could be officially
expressed by virtue of the broad and facially neutral criminal prohibition against sodomy.
See Thomas J. Coleman, Jr., Disordered Liberty: Judicial Restrictions on the Rights toPrivacy and Equality in Bowers v. Hardwick and Baker v. Wade, 12 T. MARSHALL L.
REv. 81, 89-92 (1986) (providing a succinct description of the events leading to Hardwick's
arrest as related by Hardwick in an interview).
"19 Scalia openly describes the context of the dispute as a "Kulturkampf' in which the
Court can play no role after Bowers:
If it is constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct
criminal, surely it is constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other laws
merely disfavoring homosexual conduct.... And a fortiori it is constitutionally
permissible for a State to adopt a provision not even disfavoring homosexual
conduct, but merely prohibiting all levels of state government from bestowing
special protections upon homosexual conduct....
... If it is rational to criminalize the conduct, surely it is rational to deny special
favor and protection to those with a self-avowed tendency or desire to engage in
the conduct.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 641-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
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in a teleological or even determinant manner. The law is always in
flux, particularly at those moments when judges claim to fix the
law by their decision in a particular case.
Returning to the cases under discussion illuminates this
dimension of legal reasoning. It would be folly to read these cases
in an effort to discern a logical unfolding of doctrine. The ground
keeps shifting-first criminal law, then rights of democratic
participation, and finally freedom of speech-and these different
contexts determine much about the case analysis in a way that
precludes a belief that the Court is addressing the general question
of "gay rights." Although several justices disavow what they
perceive to be the Court's refusal to address the "real question,"
there simply is no "pure, unadulterated" question to be answered.
The shifting doctrinal and historical contexts of these cases open
different angles on the seemingly singular question, and it is in this
dynamic that critical distance becomes possible.
Justice Scalia most effectively criticizes the Court's manner of
rhetorically narrowing the issues involved in the cases and makes a
plea that the Court acknowledge the real issue. In his dissent in
Romer, Scalia backs away from the doctrinal question before the
court and describes the case in terms of what he contends is really
going on: the citizens of Colorado did not act out of animus
(having recently repealed anti-sodomy criminal statutes), but
rather to express moral disapproval, "the same sort of moral
disapproval that produced the centuries-old criminal laws that we
held constitutional in Bowers."'9' In response to political success
by gays and lesbians at the local level to enact provisions that
reflect an acceptance of their sexual orientation, Scalia argues,
Colorado enacted the Constitutional amendment to reaffirm the
state's rejection of homosexuality.'92 The Court is confronting a
political battle over the moral limits to behavior in society, a
political battle that the Court should not enter under the guise of
Constitutional adjudication. Scalia concludes:
The Court today ... employs a constitutional theory heretofore
unknown to frustrate Colorado's reasonable effort to preserve
traditional American moral values.
When the Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to
be with the knights rather than the villeins-and more
191 Romer, 517 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192 "I do not mean to be critical of these [municipal] legislative successes [by gays and
lesbians]; homosexuals are as entitled to use the legal system for reinforcement of their
moral sentiments as is the rest of society. But they are subject to being countered by
lawful, democratic countermeasures as well." Romer, 517 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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specifically with the Templars, reflecting the views and values of
the lawyer class from which the Court's members are drawn....
• ..Striking [the amendment] down is an act, not of judicial
judgment, but of political will. 3
Scalia diagnoses the open questions behind the rhetoric, so to
speak, even as he disclaims the Court's competence and authority
to speak to these questions.
But Scalia remains blind to the constitutive effects of the
judicial discourse that he declares to be disconnected from the
political matters in issue. When Scalia found himself in the
majority a few years later in Dale, he did not write separately
despite the obvious irony. His deference in Romer to the political
right of Colorado citizens to instantiate their moral beliefs against
gays and lesbians in state law is not similarly extended to the
political right of New Jersey citizens to instantiate their moral
condemnation of discrimination against gays and lesbians into
state law. To suggest that the latter political activities are subject
to overriding constitutional principles of free speech is to forget
that Romer similarly held that the former political activities are
subject to equally important constitutional limitations. This is not
to say that Scalia's position in the two cases are contradictory, just
that his "Kulturkampf' analysis is insufficient to get at what is
"really going on," because he simplistically views these cases as
nothing more than political referenda on the social acceptability of
homosexuality. The first amendment context in which Dale was
decided has an enormous effect on the reasoning, as the Court
labored under the (incredibly fragile) conceptual framework of its
free expression jurisprudence generally, and the Hurley precedent
more specifically. 4
Legal resolution of the status of gays and lesbians in
contemporary American society cannot be charted in advance by
legal theorists "in the know," who then patiently prod the less
perceptive among them until reality catches up to their superior
insight. The complex legal situation is rhetorically negotiated in
myriad ways that only appear to be definitively established in the
authoritative opinions of the highest court in response to a certain
"logic of development," but which in fact is reconstituted and
extended in unpredictable ways. The next dramatic event in this
ongoing process will occur in March 2003 when the Supreme Court
again decides whether a state may constitutionally criminalize the
'93 Id. at 651-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
194 In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515
U.S. 557 (1995), the Court held that organizers of a private St. Patrick's Day parade could
not be compelled under state public accommodations law to allow the participation GLIB.
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sexual intimacy of gays and lesbians.'95 Although Lawrence v.
Texas involves a factual situation similar to that in Bowers, it is
also clear that Lawrence is an entirely different case arising within
an entirely different setting. A brief examination of the different
posture of the Lawrence case reveals how the rhetorical and
hermeneutical activities of legal practice provide openings for
critical reconstructions of that practice.
In Lawrence, two men pleaded nolo contendere to a criminal
charge under Texas's "Homosexual Conduct" law, which bans
"deviate sexual intercourse" with another person of the same
sex."6 Unlike Bowers, in which the State of Georgia had dropped
the criminal charges before trial, the defendants in Lawrence were
convicted of the offense after their constitutional challenges to the
statute failed, and each defendant was required to pay a fine and
court costs."7  In the Petition for Certiorari, the defendants
emphasize that they have experienced the very real harm of a
criminal conviction, including reputational harm, disqualification
from practicing certain professions, and having to register as
convicted sex offenders under the laws of four states.198 This case
represents the natural consequence of Bowers, as the hypothetical
potential for suffering a criminal conviction is now a criminal
conviction on appeal.
There is a significant difference at the doctrinal level as well.
Unlike the Georgia statute in Bowers, the criminal charge of
"Homosexual Conduct" specifically applies only to conduct
between members of the same sex, and does not criminalize the
exact same (consensual, non-commercial) conduct if a man and
woman engage in that conduct. As a result, the legal challenge is
framed as a violation of the Equal Protection clause, rather than a
violation of Substantive Due Process. This doctrinal distinction
yields a new set of arguments and range of justifications that will
cast the case in a different light than Bowers.19' Subsequent
195 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 661 (2002) (Mem. op. granting cert.).
196 Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349, 350 (Tex. App. 2001) (noting the defendants'
conviction under TEX. PEN. CODE §21.06, which is entitled, "Homosexual Conduct").
197 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 6, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 661 (2002) (No.
02-102).
198 Id. at 12-13.
199 Several Justices of the Texas Court of Appeals debated the significance of this
distinction. Justice Fowler concurred with the majority's determination that Bowers
plainly established the constitutionality of the statute in question, notwithstanding the fact
that Bowers analyzed the Georgia precedent under the Due Process Clause, arguing that
the "rational basis test.... does not differ depending on whether it is applied in a 'due
process' or an 'equal protection' context." Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W. 2d at 366 (Fowler,
J., concurring). In contrast, the dissenting opinion stressed the distinctions between equal
protection and due process review:
The Due Process clause has frequently been understood as an effort to restrict
10372003]
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historical research has revealed that the long-standing practice of
criminalizing sodomy that played such an important role in Bowers
was directed at the conduct involved rather than the gender of the
participants; there simply is no persuasive historical support for
the claim that the American legal tradition countenances the
punishment of homosexual intimacy because it occurs between
persons of the same sex."' What was only a subtext in Bowers, the
constitutionality of a state using sodomy laws selectively to harass
gays and lesbians, is now the principal legal question before the
Court.
Finally, it is of no small consequence that Lawrence will be
decided nearly twenty years after Bowers. First, there has been a
dramatic shift in state criminal statutes. Of the thirteen states that
continue to criminalize sodomy, nine have statutes that bar
consensual sodomy for all couples, while only two states have
explicitly limited their sodomy statute to same-sex couples.2"'
Moreover, the courts in a number of states have invalidated
sodomy statutes for violating state constitutional guarantees.2
short-term or shortsighted deviations from wiedely held social norms; it has an
important backward looking dimension. For purposes of due process, the
baseline for inquiry has tended to be the common law, Anglo American practice,
or the status quo .... Thus, in Bowers, the Court declined to find, as respondent
requested, a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy because
sodomy was not a fundamental liberty that was deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition.
The Equal Protection Clause, on the other hand, has served an entirely
different set of purposes from the Due Process Clause. That clause . . . was
consciously designed to eliminate practices that existed at the time of ratification
and that were expected to endure. The function of the Equal Protection Clause
is to protect disadvantaged groups against the effects of past and present
discrimination by political majorities. It is not rooted in common law or status
quo baselines or in Anglo-American conventions. The baseline is instead a
principle of equality that operates as a criticism of existing practice.
Id. at 377 n.12 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
200 At the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, most states
criminalized sodomy as conduct that was not grounded in the gender of the persons
involved, and although three states did limit sodomy to conduct between men, no state
defined sodomy in terms of conduct between same-sex couples generally. See Anne B.
Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden
Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082-84 (1988). Goldstein
emphasizes that, notwithstanding the rhetorical invocations of a time-honored moral
approbation of homosexuality, Bowers was premised on much more recent constructions
of homosexuality as an evil to be avoided. "Even Ithe Justices'] apparently
uncontroversial assumption that lovemaking between persons of the same sex has always
been seen as fundamentally different from heterosexual lovemaking is incorrect: This
distinction turns out to be more modern than either the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 1074-75.
201 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 197, at 4.
202 See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002) (holding that the Arkansas
sodomy statute infringes on the implicit right to privacy in the state constitution). The
Jegley court noted that nine other states have invalidated sodomy laws by judicial decision,
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Additionally, the Supreme Court's decision in Romer has
obviously shaped the manner in which the Equal Protection
challenge in Lawrence will fare.2 3  Finally, changing public
perceptions about gays and lesbians undoubtedly will play a role,
even if this role is not explained by the Justices.04 To summarize
by paraphrasing Chief Justice Warren, there is no way to turn back
the clock for purposes of constitutional adjudication, even if only
to 1986. Despite Justice Scalia's protest against "those who think
that the Constitution changes to suit current fashions, 2 5 there can
be no doubt that Lawrence will be decided in an entirely different
context than Bowers, and that this change will be significant. In
some respects, Lawrence primarily represents a battle between the
legacy of Bowers and the legacy of Romer, and so this case could
arise only at this moment in our constitutional history. The Court
can easily reach a decision in Lawrence that preserves a role for
both precedents, but the petitioners are arguing that the Court
ought to overrule Bowers in light of Romer and other
including the state of Georgia. Id. at 345 n.4. There is a legitimate argument that these
uses of state constitutions do not represent a genuine "constitutional" discourse at the
state level. See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90
MICH. L. REV. 761 (1992). It seems clear that these state court decisions represent
dissenting views about the constitutional structure of American civic life generally.
Gardner subsequently criticized the "states-as-laboratories" metaphor as it is used to
justify this manner of state constitutional practice. "The Supreme Court may learn
something from watching the state court go about its business, but it is no part of that
business to assist the Supreme Court to perform its very different function." James A
Gardner, The "States-as-Laboratories" Metaphor in State Constitutional Law, 30 VAL. U.
L. REV. 475, 490-91 (1996). Gardner's conclusion may well be justified under a positivist,
hierarchical model of constitutional governance, but in fact this is precisely the role that
the state courts are playing as highly respected rhetorical agents, and it will be part of the
rhetorical reality that will shape the Supreme Court's adjudication in Lawrence. In his
most recent article, Gardner now accepts a more "functionalist" account of the rhetorical
importance of state constitutional adjudication for ongoing constitutional discourse at the
national level. See James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National
Power: Toward a Function Theory of State Constitutions, 37 GEO. L. REV. (forthcoming
2003) (recognizing that "state judicial rejection of and divergence from purportedly
incorrect or abusive Supreme Court precedents concerning the scope of individual rights
helps check national power" in part by contributing "to the establishment of a nationwide
legal consensus at the state level, a factor which the Supreme Court sometimes considers
in the course of its own constitutional decision making") (manuscript on file with author).
I thank Jim Gardner for continuing our long-standing conversation about these matters,
and for his helpful comments on this footnote.
203 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 197, at 17 (arguing that the Supreme
Court must act to correct the mistaken conclusion by the Texas Court of Appeals that
Romer is limited to its factual context).
204 The Petition argued that since the Bowers decision, "the country has developed a
more accurate understanding of gay and lesbian couples and families," implicitly
suggesting that the Judges too might no longer be working from the same prejudices and
misunderstandings. Id. at 28.
'0* Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640-41 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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developments.2 6  Both hermeneutical appropriation and
Nietzschean critique are at work in this complex setting.
These Supreme Court cases demonstrate that interesting legal
disputes require more than simple inferences within a doctrinal
conceptual framework, but also that the "real question at issue"
can't be abstracted from these contexts altogether. Critical insight
is possible because legal reasoning is instantiated within, but
always re-shaping, doctrinal traditions. In their own ways, both
Gadamer and Nietzsche emphasize the critical potential of
tradition. Legal practice, as exemplified in the cases under
discussion, gains critical purchase in the rhetorical developments
that are made possible by the resources of tradition. Justice Scalia
offers what might appear at first glance to be a Nietzschean
critique, cutting through surface appearances to the clash of
political power that subtends the doctrinal squabbles. But in fact
his approach runs contrary to my model of critical insight. First,
he attempts to sharply divide the political battle of wills from
reasoned legal argumentation, when no such division is possible.
The doctrinal disputes bear within them the many underlying
political issues, and therefore are no less rhetorical and
hermeneutical than political disputes. Seen from the opposite
angle, he presumes that political battle is purely a question of
brute power, when in fact power is exercised rhetorically and
hermeneutically, which is to say that it is exercised in part through
the doctrinal traditions that hold their own prejudicial power.
If Justice Scalia does not fit the role of Nietzschean critic (a
comforting thought for him, we can be sure), how does one
approach these cases with the kind of critical energy that Nietzsche
unleashed against Christianity and moral philosophy? When
Justice Stevens declares that the Court is reinscribing homophobic
beliefs under the pretense of neutral constitutional
decisionmaking, 7 is he playing the role of Nietzsche declaring that
God is dead? In some respects, the answer is yes, although, like
Nietzsche, Justice Stevens will have to wait to see if his
announcement of an event that already has taken place is verified
in social life. This critical posture cannot be separated from the
rhetorical and hermeneutical elaboration of tradition, which is
more closely associated with Gadamer's philosophy, but it works
from the tradition in a different manner. Justice Stevens builds on
converging doctrinal principles to conclude that we already no
longer believe that gays and lesbians can be treated as second-class
citizens, even if we have not yet completely acknowledged this
2" Petition for Writ of Certiorari. supra note 197, at 22-30.
207 See supra notes 185 and 188.
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fact. The homophobic "God" is dead, but it is we who have killed
him with our ongoing practices. The Nietzschean claim does not
rest on a timeless absolute, but rather on a philosophical
naturalism that regards human nature as deeply interpretive.
Vattimo's weak thought espouses just this approach to
Nietzschean critique: we always are in a position to claim only that
we are interpreting our provenance, which means that we must be
ready to abandon our current beliefs in favor of a better
interpretation, but also rejects the notion that we can claim
recourse to an invariant standard by which to judge
interpretations.08 Where Justice Scalia sees a seething clash of
power-interests that is outside the realm of legal thinking, Justice
Stevens finds an event that must be announced: the overcoming of
outmoded beliefs through the re-working of traditional beliefs. 9
In these three cases we find the rhetorical character of legal
reasoning, the critical power of tradition, and the potential for
Nietzschean critique as a Verwindung within a cultural moment.
And the story continues with the Lawrence case, which shows that
even the power of discretionary review cannot insulate the Court
from legal dynamism. Legal scholars, removed from the
immediate field of play, too often lose sight of this critical
dimension of legal practice and fall back on claims grounded in an
invariant truth. Whether this "truth" is textual plain meaning,
neo-Marxist economics, political liberalism, or psychoanalytic
theory is beside the point. Legal scholars can tap into the source
208 VA-TMO, AFTER CHRISTIANITY, supra note 136, at 51.
209 Another example of this kind of announcement occurs repeatedly in the Court's
death penalty jurisprudence. In Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (t994) (den. cert.), Justice
Blackmun offered a particularly dramatic critique by stating: "From this day forward, I
shall no longer tinker with the machinery of death." Id. at 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Blackmun rehearses the development of the Court's intricate case law, juxtaposing his
personal beliefs against the death penalty and his efforts over a twenty year period to
work through the doctrine in a reasonable manner. In the end, he concludes, the doctrinal
paths are impassable and compel the conclusion that the death penalty simply cannot be
administered in a just and fair manner that also precludes arbitrariness, and therefore is in
all cases unconstitutional. Justice Blackmun's doctrinal journey provides another example
of the critical potential of working through a tradition, and also the Nietzschean posture of
declaring that the tradition has out-lived its usefulness and must be carried on in a new
manner. The point is that Blackmun's critical perspective does not come from a truthful
perspective outside a useless tradition of legal argumentation, but emerges from the
argumentation. Like Nietzsche, though, if Justice Blackmun's critique proves to be
accurate in this case it will do so only posthumously.
Justice Scalia, concurring in the denial of certiorari, wrote in response to agree that
the Court's jurisprudence is impossible, but to respond to this situation by leaving the
question to legislatures and juries. Id. at 1141-43 (Scalia, J., concurring). Again, he
attempts to divest law of political dimensions, and to divest politics of legal dimensions, in
an attempt to avoid (or at least push over to another realm) the uncertainty that flows
from the hermeneutical and rhetorical character of reasoning.
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of critique by recognizing that the model of critical hermeneutics
leads them to an engagement with practice. Nietzsche announced
the destruction of Christianity from within; critical legal theorists
face the same task. Without a guarantee or even firm guideposts,
critical legal theorists can move forward most productively by
looking to the examples of Gadamer and Nietzsche. Within the
play of their differences lies the recognition of legal critique, which
is always at once an experience and a provocation.
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